An investigation into pilot and system response to critical in-flight events, volume 2 by Rockwell, T. H. & Giffin, W. C.
  
 
 
N O T I C E 
 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED FROM 
MICROFICHE. ALTHOUGH IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT 
CERTAIN PORTIONS ARE ILLEGIBLE, IT IS BEING RELEASED 
IN THE INTEREST OF MAKING AVAILABLE AS MUCH 
INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19820005790 2020-03-21T09:56:54+00:00Z
i
r
f
f
I:
f.
C
'f.
f
RF Project 761415/711621 and 762501/713447
Final Report
i
^. (NASA-CH-16b143- V ol- 2 )	 AN INVESTlGA11CN	 Nu2-136b3	 Volume II
INTO P1LUT ANN SY51EM RESIONSE TU 4-illiLAL
IN-FLIGHT LVENIS, VOLUME 2 Final Report, 27
Oct. 1978 - 2u Juti. 1981 (Uhio Statt Uni",	 Unc:las
Columbus.)	 151 p bC AC3/ Mi A01	 CSCL 05H G3/54 J3766
the
0.10
state
university
research foundation
1314 kinnear road
colurnbus, ohio
43212
AN INVESTIGATION INTO PILOT AND SYSTEM RESPONSE TO
CRITICAL IN-FLIGHT EVENTS
Thomas H. Rockwell and Walter C. Giffin
Industrial and Systems Engineering
For the Period
October 27, 1978 - January 26, 1981
Contract No. NAS2-10047
and
November 1, 1980 - February 28, 1981
Grant No. NAG 2-75
1w
	
	
^^	 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
q, o 9Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California 94035
3 `' "
cc ^^ w
t`er 	 ^ < - ti`s June, 1981
FINAL REPORT
TIGA
	 0 PILOT AND SYSTEM RESPONSE
r
	 L 24-FLIGHT EVENTS
l
VOLUME II - APPENDIX TO FINAL REPORT
Supported By
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Ames Research Center
Moffet Field, CA 94035
NAS 2-10047
NAG 2-75
Ohio State University Research Foundation #711621 and #713447
Principal Investigators
Thomas H. Rockwell
and
Walter C. Giffin
FOREWORD
This report is prepared in two volumes. Volume I reports the Executive
Summary and the findings of the research. Volume II contains the appendices
to the final report. The appendices list detailed documentation which supports
the research findings. This includes specific materials and procedures
used in: a) the open and closed forms of the knowledge tests, b) the full
mission simulations, and c) the paper and pencil tests.
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A PPE NDIX A
DOD Interest In The CIFE Problem
1• Literature: mostly event or problem specific articles (e.g., engine fail-
ures, electrical system failures, thunderstorm penetration, wind shear,
low visibility approaches, etc.) bat some studies containing generallza-
tions ob. workload, perception, distraction, simulation, stress measure-
ment, etc.
A.	 Indices (and Repositories*)
1. Air University Index of Military Periodicals
(Air University Library*)
2. Defense Documentation Center (DDC )*
3. National Technical Information Services (NTIS)*
4. Transportation Research Information Services (IRIS)
B.	 Selected Journals
1.
i	 2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine
Aerospace Safety
MAC Flyer
TAC Attack
Combat Crew
Interceptor
Soviet Military Review
Journal of Human Stress
U.S. Army Aviation Digest
Approach (U.S. Navy)
TIG (The Inspector General) Brief
A.	 Examples of Recent lCurrent Research
A. Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory - mission management
techniques for large aircraft (pilot workload, stress, and decision
making W relation to automatic flight control systems)
B. Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory - pilot workload assessment:
measures of human operator performance in operational stress environ-
ments
C. AF Human Resources La^•^rntory - evaluation of an emergency
procedures training program
Al
D. AF Office of Scientific Research - divided attention and task
workload in control !allure detection and decision making
E. Savoy Aviation Research Laboratory (Univ. of Illinois) -
enhancement of human .ifectiveness In system design, tralaing,
and operation
F. Perceptronics, Inc. - emergency procedures training packages
G. AF School of Aerospace Medicine - stress factors in aviation
M.
	
Air Force Accident/Incident Data Bases (available to us but restricted
"For Official Use Only")
A. Hazardous Air Traffic Reports - narrative of accidents that did
not happen (similar to ASKS)
B. Main Frame Computer File - lengthy description of what happened
and findings of the accident investigation board, 1962 to present
%0.	 Management Information Technical System (MITS) (the 'one liner
liner report") aircraft data, phase of flight, time, weather, fatalities,
fire damage, parts failure, cause codes (up to two), ejection data,
accountability code, and brief remarks, 1962 to present.
D.	 Accident Investigation Reports - a complete report on eacl: accident
including who, what, where, when, how, and sometimes, why;
includes personal testimony if available
IV,	 Current Air Studies
A. "Change Pace" - by AF Safety Center, looks at causes for increase
in accident rate during 1976-78 time frame, tries to answer the "why"
question as well as summarize what happened
B. Project Hasty Blue - by Air Traiuing Command and the AF human
Resources Laboratory, deals with selection criteria for candidates
to enter USAF pilot training
V.	 Additional Methodologies for CIFE Research (not previously discussed)
A. Heuristic programming of a robot - ref- "Questionnaire Theory:
Modelling of the Pilots Mental Load" by Dominique Soulatges, Office
National d'Etudes et de Recherches Aerospatiales, Paris
B. Deriving weights for a set of activities accordin; to several criteria
via a pat-wise comparison matrix and analyzing a decision maker's
consistency - ref. A Scaling Method for Priorities in Hierarchical
Structures by Thomas L. Saaty
A2
APPENDIX B
Annotated Bibliography
(1) The National Transportation Safety Board's "Annual Review of Aircraft Accident
Data" for U.S. General Aviation, Calendar Year 1977, was reviewed to
verify that the literature searched is pertinent. Fatal and non-fatal accident
data including causes/factors cited by accident type were reviewed. It was
easily verified that pilot judgment was the underlying element in a large
percentage of accidents. What is not present are the results of near-accidents
and train of thought prior to any accident.
(2) Billings, Charles E., Ralph J. Gerke, and Robert L. Wick, Jr., "Comparisons
of Pilot Performance. in Simulated and Actual Flight" in Clinical Medicine,
March, 1975, performed in-flight and simulator experiments with experi-
enced pilots. Under varying doses of secobarbital, the subjects flew multiple
IM approaches. The data were more strongly associated with the drug level
in the simulator than in the airplane. The drug related effects were more
consistent in the simulator. Improvement in performance suggestive of learning
effects were seen in the simulator but not in actual flight.
The most important conclusion was the the GAT-1 simulator is a useful and
sensitive device for studies of the effects of mild stress on pilot performance,
but extrapolation of simulator data to the flight environment must be approached
with considerable caution.
(3) Bolz, Eric H. and Janice E. Eisele, "General Aviation IFR Operational Problems
in NASA Contractor Report 159022, April, 1979, have presented general
aviation IFR operational problems as more of an overview which defines
problems than as a system analysis. Significant is the discussion of cockpit
workload and stress. (Also significant the lank of footnoting for direct and
derived data: We are le-11t to assume the data are properly treated.) This
paper is an effort to review all the factors influencing the general aviation
pilot in the world of IFR and considers future developments currently in
planning. It is an interesting point to start considering critical in-flight
events.
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Bruggink, Gerald NI., "Managing Emergencies", in The MAC Flyer, April,
1990, in his discussion of managing emergencies, speaks of problems
'of crew coordination in crew-served aircraft. He cites decislori-making
In a true emergency situation as an area that cannot be simulated. He
claims that relying on the pat procedures in an established checklist is a
gateway to a dead end road when a "non-standard" emergency develops.
He identifies smoke, fire, takeoff and landing problems as real emergencies
where Immediate action must be taken. Other problems, at altitude, allow
more time for analysis and correction. This article is basically a call for
aviation safety through operating intelligence and conscience; it is not a
technical treatise.
(5)	 Butterbaugh, Larry C., "Crew Workload - Technology Review and Problem
Assessment", in AF Flight Dynamics Laboratory Technical Memorandum
AFFDL-TNl-7S-74-FGR, has reviewed and discussed the applications and
resulting technical requirements of pilot/crew workload measurement/
prediction methods.
In addition, existing pilot/crew workload measurement/prediction technology
Is identified and reviewed. An assessment of the adequacy of these tech-
niques relative to the identified requirements is performed. Generally, the
state of workload measurement prediction technology is not sufficiently
developed for measuring. predicting total mission-derived workload, but is
sufficient for part-task applications.
t G )	 Cavalli, Daniel, "Discrete-Time Pilot llodel". The objective of this paper
was to demonstrate the originality of his approach with regards to already
existing pilot models and to present recently obtained results. He considers
the pilot's behavior as a discrete-time process where the decision making
has a sequential nature. This model contrasts very clearly with previous
approaches, namely the quasi-linear model which follows from classical
control theory and the optimal control model which considers the human
operator as a Kalman estirnator-predictor. He also considers that the
pilot's objective may not be adequately formulated as a quadratic cost
functional to be minimized, but rather as a more fuzzy measure of the close-
ness with which the aircraft follows a reference trajectory.
All model parameters, in the digital program simulating the pilot's 1»havior,
have been successfully compared in ternis of standard-deviation and performances
1E
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with those of professional pilots in IFR configuration. The first practical
application of the pilot model has been the study of its performance
degradation when the aircraft model static margin decreases.
Of significance in his model of the human sensor/dec ision/action loops
is his observation that there is only a single loop in operation at a given
time. It is noted that this is a most fundamental difference between a
human pilot and an autopilot. This may be a valuable consideration when
designing various decision making scenarios.
(7) Ceausu, Valeriu, "The Decision In the Flight Activity", Revue Raumainte
Des Sciences Sociales-Serte De Psychologie, Vol. 15, 02, 1971.
Ceausu makes an involved, text-like analysis of pilot decision making.
His major input to the CIFE analysis is not just the various laboratory
models he develops but is the concept of present time versus future time.
The tests used present time without anticipatory capabilities available to
the subject. He acknowledges the constraining effect on his subject. It is
suggested that even the principles of laboratory psychological investigation
be revised to accomodate the "temporal dimensions".
(8) Connor, T. 'i. and Hamilton, C. W., "Final Report on Evaluation of Safeth
Programs With Respect to the Causes of Air Carrier accidents" to the FAA,
May 16, 1979. Connor and Hamilton cite, among other things, a need to
emphasize efforts at system level programs aimed at optimizing operator
performance in specified temporal and spatial conditions. New program
initiatives are required that address human error problems in behavioral
terms at detailed cause."factor levels. This will provide a very broad
knowledge base upon which further research, programs, and data can grow.
(9) Honeywell Systems and Research Center, "Crew Workload Assessment -
Development of a Measure of Operator Workload", Technical Report
AFFDL-TR-79, June 1977-September 1979. Honeywell developed a
quantitative measure of operator information processing workload for use
in crew-station evaluation. A conceptual relationship between task performance,
AS
task difficulty, and operator workload was formulated which predicts a
positive correlation between performance and workload over an inter-
mediate range of task difficulties.
After statistical evaluation, it was found that the forearm electromyogram
amplitude, respiration amplitude, and respiration duration metrics have
ordinal scale characteristics which can be used to compare design options
relatively. But further analysis is needed to generalize this or a related
metric to workload estimation in real-world flight tasks.
(1(!)	 Curry, Renwick E., John K. Lauber and Charles E. Billings, "Experiments
In Pilot Decision-Making During Simulated Low Visibility Approaches".
Curry, et. al., have devised a way to simulate stress in the laboratory
with significant correlation to pilot decision making during low visibility
approaches. They observe that despite a vast accumulation of operational
experience with the conduct of low visibility instrument approaches, little
is understood about the decision-making behavior of pilots who fly these
approaches. Likewise, there is little information regarding the man,
system, and task-related factors which influence this decision-making
behavior. Such information is essential for the rational design of new
systems, or for the redesign of existing systems in order to correct
known deficiencies.
They have assumed that it is necessary to use a simulation task which
incorporates both kinds of variables, informational and psyc hological,
to successfully study pilot decision-making behavior in the laboratory.
Their paper describes the preliminary experiments in the measurement
of decisions and the inducement of stress in simulated low visibility approaches.
ill)	 Damos, Diane L. , "Residual attention as a Predictor of Pilot Performance",
Human Factors, 1978. Damos discusses an experiment where sixteen student
pilots performed a task combination designed to measure residual attention.
Scores on this combination were correlated with performances on flight checks
administered periodically chu^ing flight training. The multiple correlation
between performances on the flight checks and the task combination increased
as the students progressed through flight training. The usefulness of residual
attention as a predictor of pilot performauce is discussed.
It is suggested that future research in this area should be concerned primarily
with determining the long-range predictive validity of measures of residual
attention. The paper does not address judgment training.
AG
(12) De'laio, Joseph, Stanley R. Parkinson, and John V. Crosby, "A Reaction
Time Analysis of Instrument Scanning", Human Factors, 1978.
DeMaio, et. al., have made a study of instrument scanning reaction time.
Detection and latency performance of instructor pilots and students pilots
was compared in a task which required searching an aircraft instrument
display for target deviations from a desired course. Performance of
instructors was superior to that of students on both detection and latency
measures. The use of stable fixation queues was reflected in the latency
performance of students. The latency performance of instructors was much
less affected by the use of such queues. Results were interpreted to
suggest that experienced pilots are able to place a greater reliance on
peripheral vision in scanulag instrument displays.
(13) Dieterly, Duncan L., "Problem Solving and Decision 'Making: An Integration",
NASA-Ames Research Center Report, AFHRL-TR-78, May, 1978.
Dieterly reviewed the areas of problem solving and decision-making to
determire if a central approach could be identified. The approach wcwild
then be applied to training others in those areas. However, In the face of
no model standardization, synthesis of research proved ineffective. The
basis; structure developed in Dieterly's research may be the basis upon
which this structure could be developed but that was not within the scope
of his project. He sub -sits that a training program embodying such concepts
would be an effective tool in decision %problem resolution Training.
(14) Dieterly, Duncan L., "Accident analysis: Application of the Decision, Problem
State Analysis Methodology", NASA-Ames Research Center Report,
AFHRL-TR-78, August, 1978. In a subsequent paper Dieterly dev-.:sped
and applied a methodology for analyzing the decistoa /problem state . This
methodology was developed to improve the present capability to ex?lain the
causes of human error accidents.
He assumed that a successful outcome may be obtained only through the
management of the decision problem state. The decision.'problem state
is the set of decision-problem conditions that must be resolved to obtain
an outcome. In the example he provides, the element of state management
is not apparent in the available record. The approach he suggested provides
a more systematic and comprehensive method for studying one major aspect
of human error in accidents. It is another step in model standardization.
r-'1
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(15) Boeing Aerospace Company, WADI User's Manual, September 30, 1976 through 	 `
June 30, 1977, Report OD180-20247-3. Boeing has published, under
contract, a document which is the User's Manual for a computer program	 ( ,
called WAM (Workload Assessment Model). The manual contains a technical
description of the analytical functions of the model. instructions for the
preparation of input data; instructions for the retrieval of WAM outpats; a
description of the deck structure and control cards required for WAM
execution; and a description of diagnostic messages generated by WAM.
WAM is used by human engineering analysts to study crew workloading at
a task or subtask level. Estimates of workload, for a given temporal
interval, are based upon the time available versus the time required to per-
form all tasks within the interval. WAM provides both printed and plotted
workload data for each operator as a function of several workload channels
(i.e., vision, hands, feet, cognitive, auditory, verbal). A task shifting
option is provided which automatically shifts tasks to reduce workload when
overload conditions are encountered.
WAM is one of several computer models developed under the Computer
Aided Function-Allocation and Evaluation System (CAFES) Program. WAM
is written in Fortran IV for use on the CDC 6600 computer with the
KRONO6 2.1 Operating System and the RUN Compiler.
(16) FAA General Aviation News, June, 1978, "Don't Give Up The Ship".
In the FAA General Aviation News two separate critical in-flight events
(in a twin Beech and a Learjet) were discussed. They happened t ,) the
same 19, 000 hour pilot. He summarized both events by saying, "The
one thing I'm sure of is that the experience shook me up enough to make
me realize something important: none of us pilots is so calm and cool
and collected but that in a moment of intense crisis we are liable to start
worrying and stop searching for the answer that may be right under our
nose. In my case (for the second event) the answer was : little to the right
and below my nose, but it was there all the time".
But it was there all the time . . . The editor noted the key point: "This
pilot's confidence in his training enabled him to solve a critical in-flight
problem". Here, then, are the two problem areas pertinent to this report,
the quality of training tempered by experience, and confidence in some.
_r
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(17) Forsyth, Donna L. and John D. Shaughnessy, 'Single Pilot IFR Operating
Problems Determined From Accident Data Analysis", NASA Technical
Memorandum, September, 1978. Forsyth and Shaughnessy made an
examination of Single Pilot Instrument Flight Rule (SPIFR) operations
from 1964-75 NTSB accident files. They concluded that problem areas
exist in pilot workload, low visibility at night due to fog and low ceilings,
icing on aircraft not deicer equipped, imprecise navigation, failure to
remain above minimum altitudes, mismanagement of fuel and low instru-
ment time. Some suggested areas of research include new types of
deicing or anti-icing equipment, standardized navigation instrument
displays, improved fuel management systems and better methods for
pilots to wafely acquire experience and increase proficiency in SPIFR
operations.
(18) Gartner, Walter B and Miles R. Murphy, "Pilot Workload and Fatigue:
A Critical Survey of Concepts and Assessment Techniques ", a Technical
Note published by NASA. Gartner and.Murphy have an in-depth literature
review on pilot workload and fatigue. It is rigorous enough for them to
be able to draw conclusions on the way the problem should be addressed,
measured, and managed. They look at measurement of pilot effort,
cognition, and other studies in sleep research.
The overall study, then, addresses the principal unresolved issues in
conceptualizing and measuring pilot workload and fatigue. These issues
are seen as limiting the development of more useful working concepts
and techniques and their application to systems engineering and management
activities. A conceptual analysis of pilot workload and fatigue, an overview
and critique of approaches to the assessment of these phenomena, and a
discussion of current trends in the management of unwanted workload and
fatigue effects are presented. Refinements and innovations in assessment
methods are recommended for enhancing the practical significance of work-
load and fatigue studies.
(19) Kowalsky, Nestor B, Richard L. `fasters, Richard B. Stone, Gary L. Babcock,
and Eugene W. Rypka, "An Analysis of Pilot Error-Related Aircraft
Accidents", NASA Contractor Report Final *CR-2444, June, 1974.
Kowalsky, et. al., present an in-depth analysis of air carrier accident
investigation problems, techniques, and solutions. They propose and apply
a systematic methodology to examine the characteristics of flights prior to
accidents (environmental factors, aircraft systems, pilot performance,
facilities, policies, procedures). They also include the contingencies per-
taining at the time of the accident, to afford consideration of all the elements
interfacing and interacting in the operation of a complex aeronautical system.
Of significance is their underlying treatment of decision making.
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(20) Levit, Robert A., "Human Behavior In Extreme Situations: Generalizations
From a Review of the Disaster Literature", Proceedings of the Human
Factors Society 22nd Annual Meeting, 1978. Levit provides a short review	 !
of disaster literature and some exemplary human factors studies. He
makes generalizations on principles of disaster management from the 	 w '
standpoint of human factors professionals. The items relevant to the
flight regime are from a study by Keating and Loftus on voice alarm
systems (VAS): (1) The system must emphasize the communication of
what is happening, why and what to do about it, (2) Messages should be
unambiguous and communicated in a manner which instills a sense of
confidence, order and control in the recipients, (3) Messages should be 	 {
delivered before emergency cues have reached a large segment of the 	 I
populace, (4) All essential information should be repeated twice using
relatively common words, and (5) The attentional value of emergency 	 r
messages is enhanced if segments are delivered by alternating male and
female voices.
(21) Hart, Sandra G., "A Cognitive Model of Time Perception", presented at the
56th Annual Meeting of the Western Psychological Association, April,
1976. Hart defines the terms and basic model used in the research and
papers described relow.
(22) Hart, Sandra Gail and Duncan McPherson, "Airline Pilot Time Estimation
Duiing Concurrent Activity including Simulated Flight", presented at the
47th Annual Meeting of the Aerospace Medical Association, May, 1976.
In further developing the utility of pilot time estimation, Hart and
McPherson clarify the functional relationships between the lcngtb and
variability of time estimates and concurrent task variables. This is one
way to provide an unobtrusive and minimally loading additional task
that is sensitive to differences in flying conditions and aircraft instrumenta-
tion associated with complex piloting tasks.
(23) Hart, Sandra Gail, Duncan 1c Pherson and Leslie L. Loomis, "Time Estimation
As A Secondary Task to Measure Workload: Summary of Research",
presented at the 15th Annual Manual, 1978. Hart, McPherson, and Loomis
have outlined the results of a longer series of experiments designed to 	 j
evaluate the utility of time estimation as a secondary measure of piloting
workload. Actively produced intervals of time were found to Increase in
length and variability, whereas retrospectively produced intervals decreased
in length although they also increased in variability with the addition of a
variety of flight-related tasks. If pilots counted aloud while making a
production, however, the impact of concurrent activity was minimized, at
least for the moderately demanding primary tasks that were selected. The
effects of feedback on estimation accuracy and consistency were greatly
enhanced if a counting or tapping production technique was used. This
compares with the minimal effect that feedback had when no overt timekeeping
technique was used.	
Y^V
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Actively made verbal estimates of sessions filled with different activates
decreased in length as the amount and complexity of activities performed
during the Interval were increased. Retrospectively made verbal
estimates, however, increased in length as the amount and complexity
of activities performed during the interval were increased. These
results support the suggestion that time estimation provides a useful
index of the workload involved in performing concurrent tasks.
(24) Jensen, Richard S., "Pilot Judgment: Training and Evaluation". Jensen
covers a large area in the state-of-the-art of pilot decision making.
He examines various techniques and measures of training and testing
effectiveness, defines judgment I:. two ways, and considers the problems
in teaching judgment.
In looking at learning principles, available training media, computer-aided
instruction and situational emergency training, Jensen leads into the
problem of judgment evaluation. Many points are made which could lead
to scenario development for evaluating and training in situational emergencies.
(25) Murphy, M. R., "Analysis of Eighty-four Commercial Aviation Incidents:
Implications for a Resource Management Approach to Crew Training", In the
1980 Proceedings Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium Manual.
Murphy considers air crew performance from a resource management view-
point. He observes that resource management training should be concentrated
on: (1) interpersonal communications, with Air Traffic Control (ATC) infor-
mation of major concern, (2) Task management, mainly setting priorities
and appropriately allocating tasks under varying workload levels, (3) Planning,
coordination, and decision making concerned with preventing and recovering
from potentially unsafe situations in certain aircraft mareuvers. Problem
solving and leadership skills were implicated as factors in a sufficient
number• of incidents to require further study. Leadership, social skills,
and role-Issue effects may be under-reported in voluntarily submitted
incident data: more systematic study is recommended. Some problem
areas are identified for which design changes are apparently i i order,
particularly the ATC interface.
All
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(26) NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System: Ninth Quarterly Report, NASA
Technical Memorandum 78608. This report publishes the results of
	
a study on Distraction - A Human Factor in Air Carrier Hazard Events.	 j
As a frequent contributor or cause of hazardous events, distraction
incidents (where attention is diverted from aircraft management, such
	
as heading control) can be type-classified. Both air and ground opera-	 1 11
tions suffer accidents where the normal crew coordination designed as
a human-engineered series of tasks is interrupted. By following
established cockpit priorities, reformatting charts, SIDS, approaches,
etc., reading distractions can be reduced. Autopilot monitoring ("who's
flying the airplane?"), improved air/ground communications, weather,
passenger problems, controller inputs, and many other items are con-
sidered as distractions. Reductng the cockpit workload results in more
time for vigilance and anticipation of events requiring judgment. The a
underlying theme of the report is that a good train of thought is easily
and often disturbed through distraction.
(27) Roscoe, Alan H., "Stress and Workload in Pilots", Aviation, Space, and
Environmental Medicine, April, 1978. Roscoe observes that several
studies have highlighted the increase in physiological activity which
occurs in pilots during flight and especially during takeoffs and landings.
For example, it has been clearly demonstrated that pilots' heart rates
increase during the landing approach to reach a peak at or just before
touchdown. These changes have been attributed to workload and to
psychological or emotional stress. This paper examines a number of
test pilots' aeart rate responses recorded during va: ious flight trials
involving different types of aircraft. Examples include ramp take-
offs in a VTOL fighter, automatic landings in fog, supersonic flight
through monsoon rain, and a sortie in which the pilot developed acute
aapendicitio. It is concluded that heart rate responses in experienced
pilots are influenced almost entirely by workload-related factors and
not by emotional stressors, such as risk and anxiety. Because of the
emotional overtones of the word "stress", it is suggested that the term
workload should be used when referring to the reason for increased
cardiovascular activity in pilots.
(28) Thorpe, Jack y , Elizabeth L. IN:artin, Bernell J. Edwa,as, and Edward E.
Eddowes, "Situational Emergency 'Draining: F-15 Emergency Procedures
Training Program", Interim Report for Air Force Systems Command,
July 1975 - January 1976. Thorpe, et. al., discuss the comparative
strengths and weaknesses of Situational Emergency Training (SET) versus
Boldface checklist reactions. Since the latter Is simply the critical steps
that must be taken to reduce an emergency, there is room for pilot error
in maintaining control of the aircraft, developing another emergency, and
losing positional awareness. 'There is little thought (judgment) applied,
just immediate actions.
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The objective of their work was to develop and evaluate an emergency
procedures training program for the F-15. The three applicable in
all emergency/abnormal situations specified for F-15 operations are:
(a) maintain aircraft control, (b) analyze the situation and take the proper
action, and (c) land as soon as practicable. The traditional emergency
procedures common to other USAF weapons systems featuring Boldface
procedures which must be committed to memory do not exist for the F-15.
The strengths and weaknesses of both approaches were noted. Five
conclusions were derived from this comparative analysis: (a) the trad-
itional Boldface approach has several deficiencies which may reduce the
probability that judgment will be exercised when needed, (b) SET is more
comprehensive than Boldface, encourages the development of judgment,
and centers training around all three emergency rules listed above,
(c) the underlying concept of SET is situational training, an approach
which systematically manipulates the important dimensions of the
emergency situation. The pilot is taught to discriminate the relevant
from the irrelevant dimensions of the situation, a discrimination process
which is fundamental to exercising judgment, (d) pilots report a positive
attitude towards SET training sessions, which in turn has resulted in
k what supervisors feel is a more productive training program, and (e) by
using a scenario development procedure, it is hypothesized that SET can
be more effective.
(29) Trollip, Stanley R., "The Evaluation of a Complex Computer-Based Flight
Procedtires Trainer", Human Factors, 1979. Skills such as flying
holding patterns are taught in planes or simulators. An alternative method
is to use computer-assisted instruction (CAI; which emphasizes training
requirements rather than physical fidelity. Such a program was written
l	 and evaluated. Traditional ground school methods were compared with the
CAI method. All subjects completed a training sequence in a ground
trainer. Those taught by computer performed better and attained criterion
t quicker with significantly fewer critical errors. Results indicate the CAI
offers an effective alternate to the costly trainers currently in use.
(30)	 Verstynen, Harry A., "A Possible Role For the Pilot in the Future ATC
System", presented at the fall conference of the Air Traffic Control
Association, October, 1978. Verstynen presents an overview of the
role of the pilot in the future ATC system. He admits to bias and seeks
the reader's judgment of validity. He poses some interesting problems
and possible outcomes. He concludes that the role of the p±lot in the future
ATC system is likely to be substantially changed from the role of the pilot
today. The two major factors effecting this role will be the shifting of
certain ATC functions from the ATC system to the pilot and the develop-
ment of onboard processing capabilities which will relieve the pilot of
many of the functions to which machines are better suited than humans.
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The pilot will progressively become less of a control manipulator
and more of a manager of a system which combines traditional. outer
loop tasks such as navigation, planning, and resource management
with new roles as a tactical situation manager.
(31) Walden, Rex S. and William B. Rouse, "Queueing Model of Pilot Decision-
making In a Multitask Flight Management Situation", IEEE Transactions
On Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-8, December, 1878.
Walden and Rouse model pilot decision making as a queueing problem.
Allocation of decisionmaking responsibility between pilot and computer
is considered, and a flight management task, designed for the study
of pilot-computer interaction, is discussed. A queuelag theory
model of pilot decision making in this multitask control and monitoring
situation is presented. An experimental investigation of pilot decision
making and the resulting model parameters are discussed.
They conclude that he queueing formulation of the control and monitoring
situation presente-! is attractive. With the exception of the control task
service rate, the parameters of the model are "eminently measureable",
at least in controlled experiments. Whether this is transferrable to the
real world is not discussed.
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APPENDIX C
Trip Summary Outline - W.C. Giffin, T.H. Rockwell, J. Schofield
	
1.	 NTSB - March 12, 1979
A.	 Participants
1. James Danaher, Chief Operational Factors Division
2. Gerrit Walhout, Chief Human Factors Division
3. Dave Kelly, Chief Information System Division
B.	 Su ggested Contacts
1. Al Diehl, Human Factors Engineering - NTSB
2. Ward Edwards, Prof. (?) (Fighter Pilot Decisions)
f	 3. Jim Loomis, Bat.elle (NTSB Data)
4. Emil Spieza, Fort Rucker (Viet Nam Data)
C.	 Interesting Data
1. 80 man hours to report BA accident
2. "In-House" documents behind blue cover reports
3. Danaher list of resource management accidents for future study
4. 65 pilot factors in NTSB data
S. Accident identified by "nearest post office"
6. Two years cases at NTSB - rest in archives
7. FAA training approval through air carrier training office (ATCO)
8. Fort Rucker factor analysis of Viet Nam data
	
2.	 ATA - ;%larch 12, 1979
A.	 Pa sticipants
1. H.G. (Grady) Gatlin. Director of Operations
2 Frank Pr!l dy, Director NAS Systems Engineering (ATA)
3. Larry ­ il'{.spie. NIGR, DF FLT. OPS .
4. Vern Ballenger, Director of Engineering
5. Bob Smith, ATC
6. Peter Duprey
B.	 Suggested Contacts
1. Airline Safety Directors (see Gatlin letter 3/13/79)
2. Dave Thomas, GAMA
A15
3. Jim Gannet, Boeing Human Factors
4. Flight Safety Foundation
5. NASA/Langley (Air Crew Performance Evaluation)
6. ICAO, (Accident/Incident Report for INTN'L)
7. Captain H. T. Nunn, Northwest (Loft)
C.	 Interesting Data
1. Line oriented flight training
2. ASRS - best hope for incident data
3. Gatlin "horror show" of unreported incidents
4. American Airlines BAC III - record of human factors information
(24 parameters)
S. United Airlines - Safety Awareness Program
	
3.	 Mitre. Air Transport Division - March 12, 1979
A.	 Participants
1. Dr. J.S. Matney
2. Dr. Glen Kenney - ATC Human Factors
3. Pat McKay - Division Chief
B.
	
Interesting Data
1. Gear study to FFS modernization program ? (e.g., natural for
computer aid to distressed pilot)
2. Lovelace report - on site air carrier pilot analysis
3. ATC system errors - 600/yr. - in-house monitoring
4. Improve work habits to reduce system errors
5. Problem with unreported errors
6. System error causes
i. Lack of controller awareness of own limitations
it. Lack of standard work habits
tit. Delay action (reluctant to tell A/C what to do)
	
4.	 ALPS► -:March 13, 1979
A.	 Participants
;. Bill Edmunds, Human Performance Specialist
2. Dick Stone, Delta Captain and Chairman of Committee
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B.	 Suggested Contacts
1. Homer Mouden, Flight Safety Foundation (703-820-2777)
2. Topmiller, WPAFB
3. J. D. Smith, United
4. Mack Eastburn, United
C.	 Interesting Data
1. Simulator; demonstration of proficiency for FAA only
2. Ask pilot "what scares you ?"
3. CIFE - events which take A/C out of normal flight envelope
4. Crew often unaware of participation in CIFE
5. False alarms compromise warning systems
6. Training not consistent with real world
7. Difference between success and failure is information
8. ALPA gold medal award (annual)
9. Lovelace report (stone involved)
10. United and Allegheny good sources
11. Competition in cockpit - who can solve problem first
12. Crew lounge interviews
13. Resources management - why give decision maker manipulative
functions ?
5. AOPA - March 13, 1979
A. Participants
1. Russel Lawton
B. Suggested Contacts
1. John Shaughnessy - NASA/Langley (804-827-3917)
(time line analysis for single pilot IFR)
C. Interesting Data
1. AOPA market survey might include CIFE questions
2. Plantation tarty seminar
3. AOPA has docket on member accident reports
4. Lawton working on paper "Pilot Distress"
5. Royal A/F - pilot workload/stress
i	
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6.	 DSR - Bolling AFB - March 13, 1979 (J. Schofield)
	
U
A.	 Participants
1. Jack Thorpe
B.	 Suggested Contacts
1. Dr. Wayne Waag - AFHRL/FT, Williams AFB (8-474-6945)
(C-5 Pilot Performance Measures Project)
2. Hans Heinrich and Lt. Col. Rudy Hartzog - SAC/Instructional
Systems Development (8-271-2674/3015)
C.	 Interesting Data (AFOSR Contracts and Grants)
1. Herbert A. Colle (Wright State University) - a capacity theoretic
approach to workload assessment
2. Diane Damos (State University of New York) - training efficient
multiple-task strategies
3. Herbert Land and Stuart E. Dreyfus (University of California,
Berkeley) - formal versus situational models of expert decision-
making
4. Daniel Gopher - task load and operator attention capacity in time-
sharing performance
5. Gary S. Krahenbuhl (Arizona State University) - stress and learning
In the flying training environment
6. Luigi Lucaccini, Amos Freedy, and Rosemarie Hopl-Weichel
(Perceptronics, Inc.) instructional system development and
evaluation of situational emergency training
i Airlines - April 19, 1979
Participants
1. J. D. Smith, Vice President
2. Tom Dawe, Flight Operations Safety Task Force
Interesting Data
1. NASA contract with UAL to bring SST into ATC system
2. UAL involved in basic program for ASRS - foreign and domestic
3. UAL internal report system
a) co. immunity
b) 180 reports 1977-1979
c) ATC incidents, equipment malfunctions., procedures
d) all United reports go to ASRS
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4. monitored approach concept - crew coordination
5. 24 hr. maintenance function avail to patch for help
6. Navy study - Dr. Alkov - fatals came from "best" pilots
who couldn't cope with marital, budget, etc. problems
7. command training module - how to train decision makers
8. "irregularity" reports - UAL has 5000/yr.
9. cardinal sin - operating by assumption
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APPENDIX D
Open Form Knowledge Survey with Answer Key
and Description of Six Pilot Knowledge Areas
You have been asked to help the OSU Systems Research
Group develop a means of testing pilot knowledge of
aircraft sub-system operation. Please give a short
answer to each of the following questions in the space
provided. If you need more space, use the back of
that page .
Although this questionaire will not be graded, you
may wish to compare your responses to our own answer
key.
Thank you for your help and cooperation.
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i 1. What is the only method to assure the fuel boost pump is operating?
2. Name a few design innovations Intended to minimize "sloshing" in a fuel tank.
3. Name a source in the cc::kptt of determining the amount of usable fuel an
airplane is capable of carrying (other than the Aircraft Operating Manual).
4. Does a turn coordinator and a turn-and-bank indicator provide you with
i	 identical Information ? If no, what Is the difference?
5. Should ammeter indications fluctuate with changes in engine RPM with an
alternator system?
6. What would be an indication of an alternator malfunction?
r
7. Aircraft operating manuals usually suggest the fuel boost pump be turned on
for take-offs and when conducting low altitude (less than 1000' AGL) operations
I	 (on airplanes that require them). What is the reason for this ?
8. What is the function of a voltage regulator?
9. Is structural icing considered a likely event above the clouds ? Why ?
10. What is the standard adiabatic lapse rate ?
11. What indications would tell the pilot his alternator system is operating
normally, or "acceptably" ? Do the indications of "normal operation" change
during the course of a flight?
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12. Define IAS, CAS, TAB.
13. If an alternator is removed from the rest of the electrical system by an
automatic circuit protection device (i.e., an auto-reset circuit breaker),
how can the pilot attempt to bring the alternator back into service?
14. If smoke is noticed in the cabin, what indicators would tell the pilot it is
"electrical" in origin? What should he do?
15. When the battery power is sufficiently "run down", an "alternator restart"
may be impossible. What does this mean and why does it happen?
16. What does an ammeter tell the pilot?
17. What does the term "unusable fuel" mean?
18. What could cause a sharp, sudden decrease in RPM, and pronounced
engine roughness ?
19. What range of temperature and atmospheric conditions is most likely to
to cause carburetor ice ?
20. What airspeed and altimeter errors are associated with the use of an
interior alternate static air source in unpressurized airplanes ?
2.L. What is "detonation" and when does it occur?
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22. If it becomes necessary to continue operation with the use of full carburetor
heat, what action should be taken to insure smooth engine operation?
23. What does a suction gauge, or instrument air gauge, indicate ?
24. in what temperature range should carburetor heat not be used?
25. What is the reason for not using carburetor heat during ground operations ?-
26. Periodically, an ordinary directional gyro needs to be reset to keep its
indications consistent with that of the magnetic compass. Why is this so ?
27. What do ground based weather and airborne weather radar systems detect
and display?
28. What are the symptoms indicating the onset of carbon-monoxide poisoning?
i
29. Is there any ground-assisted instrument approach procedure, other
than PAR or ASR, which can be made in an emergency? (Ground-assisted
assumes that all the pilot needs is a two-way radio).
So. What is the difference between a "slaved" directional gyro and a non-slaved
one ?
31. Which gyro flight instrument is most likely to tumbl-- last"
32. How can a pilot determine that his alternator is operating properly (before
he takes off) ?
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33. Master switches, on aircraft with alternator systems, usually consist of
two switches labeled BATTERY and ALTERNATOR which can be turned
ON or OFF. Which of these two switches, when turned OFF, automatically,
' turns off the other side as well?
34. Describe the possible ways a pilot could remove the alternator from the
rest of the electrical field, and operate solely on battery power.
35. What causes a gyroscopic flight instrument to tumble, i.e., give grossly
erroneous or nonsense information?
36. Name all of the "unsafe gear" indications you can recall, that a manufacturer
uses in airplanes with retractable gear.
37. In an airplane equipped with retractable landing gear, what guidelines
normally determine the point of retraction?A
38. Explain your procedure for power application and power reduction in an
airplane equipped with a constant-speed propeller s
..i
39. What determines the configuration of cowl flaps during a climb ?
40, Define the terms "service ceiling" and "absolute ceiling". i
41. Are airspeeds marked on the airspeed indicator in terms of IAS, CAS, or TAS ?
L
4.2. If there is a loss of oil pressure, how would aconstant -speed propeller be
affected ?
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43. Begin with ;,he slowest "V" speed shown on au airapccu iuutaatiur anu
describe each In order, including its' significance.
44. Some gyro flight instruments are "vacuum" driven. What does this mean?
45. Where does carburetor ice form (induction ice) ?
46. How can a pilot usually tell when detonation occurs ?
47. What would you do if you encountered severe turbulence in IF  conditions ?
48. Assume you encounter instrument conditions immediately after lift-off.
A short time later you notice your airspeed indicator showing a steady
decrease, altimeter still shows field elevation, and your VSI shows a
zero rate of change. (Attitude Indicator still shows normal climb). What
is your response ?
49. What is the cause of most engine failures in flight?
50. How is vacuum system pressure differential kept at a constant value
throughout the range of normal operating RPMs and altitudes ?
51. Suppose your pilot tube became totally and rapidly blocked (i.e. , ice) at
5000' while you were climbing to 10, 000'. Assuming the aircrafts true
airspeed remained the same during the climb through 5000', what indica-
tions would you expect from your airspeed indicator, altimeter, and vertical
speed indicator?
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52. Assuming the failure of all gyroscopic flight 	 how can anB	 83'Y'	 P	 ght instruments
pilot directionally control an airplane in a decent through an overcast? 	 F
53. At what altitude should leaning be attempted under normal cruising power
(less than 75 0), in a direct drive, fixed pitch, float type carburetored
airplane ?
54. In what free air temperature range would expected structural icing?
55. If you suspect your air filter has become obstructed or iced-over in flight,
what action should you take and why?
56. What Is the best method for temporarily correcting preignition and detonation?
57. What could cause a gradual drop in RPM and engine roughness (float type
carburetor)?
58. Wliat flight instruments would be affected by a total blockage of the static
port ?
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Answer Key To Open Form Knowledge Survey
1. Turn on the fuel pump before starting the engine. There should be an increase
in fuel pressure as indicated on fuel pressure gauge.
2. Baffles and Rubber Bladders.
3. Can the Fuel Selector valve or the Fuel Shut-off valve.
4. No. A turn and bank indicator reveals direction and rate of turn. A turn
coordinator provides that information plus the rate and direction of roll.
Both instruments have 'balls" which tell the quality of coordinated flight.
5. No.
6. An excessively high rate of charge, any discharge, illumination of an over-
voltage light, if equipped, or a tripped alternator circuit breaker.
7. This is done to insure an uninterrupted flow of fuel to the engine in the event
the mechanical pump fails. Engine failure at such a critical altitude may
not allow enough time for a successful restart.
S. To regulate the rate of charge of the battery, and to place electrical load on
the alternator.
9. No, visible moisture is necessary.
10. 2° C/1000 ft.
11. A zero rate or a slightly positive rate of charge indicates a normal operation.
Yes, normal indications do change during the course of a flight: after engine
start, charge rate is slightly higher than at other times.
12. IAS = Indicated Air Speed = speed read directly from indicator.
CAS = Calibrated Air Speed = IAS corrected for position and instrument errors.
TAS = True Air Speed - calibrated air speed correct for nonstandard tempera-
ture and pressure.
13. Turn off alternator switch for a moment, then turn back on.
14. Smells like burning insulation. Turn off all switches and isolate faulty
equipment by turning switches on one at a time.
a.
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15. It occurs because the battery power is insufficient to close the relay to
bring the alternator into the electrical field. If this happens it means the
battery will not charge even if the airplane is jump started. 	 1
16. The rate of battery charge or discharge, or the amount of electrical load
assumed by the alternator.
17. Fuel remaining in the tanks which cannot be relied upon for use in all nor-
mal flight attitudes or conditions.
18. Magneto malfunction or internal engine failure.
19. 32° to 80° F with relative humidity 50% or more.
20. Airspeed reads higher than actual and altimeter reads higher than actual,
and there is more of a lag in indications.
21. Detonation is the uncontrolled explosion of fuel in the power stroke caused
by overheating or improper grades of fuel.
22. Lean the mixture.
23. The difference between pressure inside the system (vacuum network) and
the pressure outside the system.
24. Below 15° F.
25. Unfiltered air enters the carburetor with the carburetor heat "on".
26. It is due to precession from motion and drag in the bearings.
27. Precipitation.
28. Feelings of sluggishness, tightness across forehead, warmth, headaches,
throbbing, pressure at the temples.
29. Yes, an emergency D. F. approach.
30. A slaved directional gyro continuously corrects itself with respect to a
remote magnetic compass, whereas a non-slaved one must be react manually.
31. A dun-and-bank indicator or a turn coordinator.
32. Turn on landing light (or other high load device). For a charge-discharge
ammeter, needle should flicker and return to original position. For a
load type ammeter, needle should indicate higher than originally.
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33. Battery.
34. Turn off alternator master switch, or trip the alternator circuit breaker.
35. They tumble when they are forced beyond their mechanical limits, or
when there is an insufficient rate of rotation.
36. Gear horn, gear-in-transit lights, unlit gear down light, 'barber poles",
gear position indicator, or gear emergency extension handle.
37. Retract at point in take-off where insufficient runway ahead remains for
landing.
38. Adding power prop forward then throttle; reducing power, throttle back then
prop.
39. Cylinder head temperature.
40. Service ceiling is the altitude at which maximum rate of climb is 100 fpm.
Absolute ceiling is altitude where maximum rate of climb is zero.
41. CAS.
42. Prop would move to high RPM (low pitch).
43. VSO s stall speed - landing configuration.
VS1 r stall speed - gear and flaps retr. anted
VFE $ maximum speed with flaps extended
VNO - maximum structured cruising speed
VNE 
v'
	exceed speed
44. Air is sucked out of instrument case by a vacuum and incoming air is
directed at rim of gyro rotor, causing it to spin.
45. Throttle plate and walls of carburetor venturi.
46. under normal circumstances he can not.
1. i	 47. Reduce speed below V A , maintain level attitude.
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48. You should select an alternate sta! .c source.
49. Fuel starvation or mismanagement.
50. By a suction relief valve.
51. Airspeed would increase, altimeter and VSI remain unaffected.
52. Use a magnetic compass on a heading of south. Or " bome" to a distant
station on ADF.
53. Any altitude.
54. 32' F or colder.
55. Apply full carburetor heat to provide alternate source off air for the carburetor.
56. Enrich mixture, open cowl flaps, reduce power.
57. Carburetor ice.
s8. Altimeter, VSI, and airspeed indicator.
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Six Pilot Knowledge Areas Covered In Otm
Area
Engine and Engine Operations 	 18,19, 21,
Fuel Systems	 1, 2, 7,17
Electrical Systems	 5, 6, 8,11,
Cockpit ;r^strumentation	 3, 4,12, 20
Weather	 9,10, 27, 2
General and IFR Procedures	 29,36,37,
^^ 	 Ii
II.
M.
N.
V.
IV.
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APPENDIX E
Closed Form Knowledge Survey With Answer
Key and Description of 'Three Pilot Knowledge Areas
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A/C SYSTEMS SURVEY
Circle Correct Answer
(Name)
1. What is the standard adiabatic lapse rate?
	 -
i	 a. 2 °F per 1000 feet
b. 2h * F per 1000 feet
c. 3°F per 1000 feet
d. 3'h°F per 1000 feet
e. 4°F per 1000 feet
2.	 Do the indications of a normally operating alternator system
change during the course of a flight? (Assume charge-discharge ammete:
a. Yes: Ammeter shows more charge when electrical equipment
turned on.
b. Yes: Ammeter shows less charge when electrical equipment
is turned on.
c. After engine start, the ammeter shows a higher than normal
rate of charge and gradually declines to normal rate.
^d. No, does not change.
3.	 If an alternator is removed from the rest of the electrical
system by an automatic circuit protection device (i.e., an
auto reset circuit breaker, how can the pilot attempt to
bring the alternator back into service?
a. Turn off the alternator and turn it back on.
b. Turn off all switches and push reset button.
C. Turn off switches one by one and push the reset after
each switch is turned off.
d. Just push the reset button.
4.	 If smoke is noticed in the cabin, what indicators would tell
the pilot that it is electrical in origin?
a. Discharge on ammeter
b. Odor
C. Erratic instrument indications
d. Circuit breaker popped
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5.	 In what range of temperatures is one ,-Most likely to encounter
carburetor ice?
a. 32°F or below
b. 20-40°F
c. 32-80°F
d. 50-80°F
6. What airspeed and altimeter errors are associated with the
use of an interior alternate static source in unpressurized
airplanes?
a. Airspeed and altitude read higher than actual.
b. Airspeed and altitude read lc:er than actual
c. Airspeed reads higher and altitude reads lower than actual
d. Airspeed reads lower and altitude reads higher than actual
	
7.	 If it becomes necessary to continue operation with the use of
full carburetor heat, what action, if any, should be taken
to insure'smooth engine operation?
a. Enrich mixture
.b. Lean mixture
c. :avoid high power settings
d. No action required
8. What do ground based and airborne weather radar systems detect
,and display?
a. Precipitation
b. Clouds
c. Thunderstorms
d. Turbulence
9. Which gyro flight instrument is most likely to be the last
to tumble?
a. Artificial horizon
b. Turn and bank indicator
c. Directional gyro
A. Depends on maneuver
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10.	 Master switches, on aircraft with alternator systems, usually
consist of two switches labeled "battery" and "alternator,"
which can be turned on or off. Which of these two switches,
when turned off, automatically turns off the other s4de as
well?
a. Battery
b. Alternator
c. Neither: both must be turned off
11. What determines the configuration of cowl flaps during a climb?
a. Cylinder head temperature
b. Exhaust gas temperature
c. Oil temperature
d. Outside air temperature
12. Which of the following is the best definition of the service
ceiling of an aircraft?
a. Maximum altitude at which the A/C can maintain level flight
b. Maximum altitude at which the A/C can climb 100 fpm
A. Maximum altitude at which the A/C can climb 500 fpm
d. Maximum altitude to which the A/C can climb
	
13.	 If there is a loss of oil pressure, how would a constant speed
propeller be affected? (Assume a non-counterweight type propeller)
a. It would not be affected
b. It would move to high rpm
c. It would move to low rpm
d. It would vary between high and low rpm
	
14.	 Which of the following is the best procedure if you encounter
severe turbulence in IFR conditions?
a. Reduce speed below VA , maintain level altitude
b. Reduce speed below VA , pull on carb heat
C.- Reduce speed below VA , maintain level attitude
d. Maintain speed and level altitude
e. Maintain speed and level attitude
n
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a. Airspeed decrease altimeter and VSI show climb
b. Airspeed increase altimeter and VSZ show climb__,_
C. Airspeed decrease altimeter 5000 and VSI zero
d. Airspeed increase altimeter 5000 and VSI zero
16.	 Assuming the failure of all gyroscopic instruments, how can
pilot directionally control an airplane in a descent through
an overcast?
15.	 Suppose your pitot tube became totally and rapidly blocked
(i.e., ice) at 5000 feet while you were climbing to 10,000 feet.
Assuming • the aircraft's true airspeed remained the same during
the climb from 5000 feet, what indications would you expect
from your airspeed indicator, altimeter, and vertical speed	 ,.
indicator?
a. Reduce power, trim for 500 fpm descent
b. Use turn and bank indicator for directional control
c. Call approach control for vectors
d. Use magnetic compass on a heading of south
	
17.	 At what altitude should leaning be attempted under normal
cruising power (less than 75%) in a direct drive, fixed pitch,
float type carburetored airplane?
,a. 3000 feet MSL
b. 5000 feet MSL
c. 6000 feet MSL
d. Any altitude
	
18.	 In what free air temperature would a pilot expect structural
icing to occur
a. 32°F or below
b. 32 0 to +40°F
C. -10 to 32°F
d. Above 32°F
19.	 If yob- suspect that your air filter has become obstructed or
iced-over in flight, what action should you take and why?
a: Apply full carburetor heat to melt ice
b. Apply full carburetor heat to provide alternate source of air
c. Lean mixture so.less air would be required
d. Land immediately: can't melt ice on filter
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20. what is the best method for temporarily correcting pre-ignition
and detonation?
a. Lean mixture and reduce power
b. Enrich mixture and reduce power
C. Lean mixture and increase power
d. Enrich mixture and increase power
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ANSWER KEY FOR CLOSED FORM SURVEY
1. D 11. A
2. C 12. B
3. A 13. B
4. B 14. C
S. C 15. B
6. A 16. D
7.B 17.D
8. A 18. A
9. B 19. B
10. A 20. B
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Three Pilot Knowledge Areas Covered In Closed Form Survey
Area	 Pertinent Questions 	 Code*
I. Engine and fuel systems
	 5, 7,11,13,17, I.4, 20
	 CATSCR 1
II. Electrical systems and cockpit
instrumentation	 2,3,4,10,6,9,-15
	 CATSCR 2
M. Weather and IFR operations
	 1, 8,18,12,14,16
	 CATSCR 3
*For reference to data in Chapter VI, also see Glossary Table VI-3.
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APPENDIX F
GAT-1 FMS Performance Profiles
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SCENARIO: #1	 ACTION: 1) Returned to
SUBJECT: #1	 Seaport 2) Shot ADF approach
Subject #1 is a low-time (400 hours) GA private pilot with very little instrument
experience (7 hours actual). He flies infrequently and strictly for pleasure.
Subject 01 exhibited difficulty in performing basic stick and rudder skills. He
has difficulty holding altitude and beading and devoted much of his cockpit
attention to scanning charts. He appeared nervous as exhibited by a constant
stream of remarks to himself and occasional whistling. When power failure
occurred he immediately reached for the fuel selector and restored power.
During debriefing he stated that he noticed that the fuel gauge was reading low.
Furthermore be had had a similar experience before which accounted for his
fast diagnosis.
Subject #1 was quick to inform ATC of his difficulties and required considerable
guidance to successfully complete the mission. His overriding concern seemed
to be to return "home" just as quickly as possible.
Subject #i's management style might be characterized as 1) reactive (he did
not seem to have well thought out alternatives); 2) dependent (he asked for
and received considerable aid from ATC); 3) repetitive (he returned to his
departure point because he viewed that as a "conservative" and was familiar
with current procedures and weather at that point).
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SCENARIO: #1	 ACTION: 1) Proceeded
SUBJECT: #2	 direct to Mountaindale
per flight plan	 f
L!	 ;
Subject 02 is a high-time GA pilot (8000 hours) with most of his flight experience
being in single engine aircraft operating in VFR conditions. Although he once
flew professionally his activities in recent years have been limited to pleasure
flying and occasional business trips Ina C 172.
Subject #2 exhibited a high degree of stick and rudder competence. His only
pre-CIFE difficulties stemmed from failure to note a change in clearance and
garbled communications. The onset of the CIFE was initially diagnosed as an
icing problem. When Garb heat failed to restore power he immediately went to
the fuel selector and successfully restored power.
Subject #2 was extremely self-reliant. At no time did he inform ATC that he
was having difficulty. He had faith in his diagnosis of fuel siphon on one tank
only and in his calculated fuel consumption (evidenced in debriefing). He con-
tinued to his planned destination without consulting the area cl:^rt for potential
alternates.
Subject #2 1s management style might be characterized as one which involves
1) thorough pre-flight preparation; 2) rigid adherence to plans (he carried
through the entire mission as planned); 3) self-reliance; and 4) minimum external
soarce information seeking.
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SCENARIO: #1	 ACTION: 1) Divert to
SUBJECT: #3	 Link Co 2) Shot VOR
approach at Link
Subject 03 is a medium time pilot (1200 hrs.) with most of his experience
in military helicopters and fixed-wing single engine aircraft. His current
GA flying is related to occasional business trips in a C-182.
Subject #3 exhibited extreme difficulty in basic aircraft control. Aircraft
heading and altitude excursions had both high fi equency and high arrplitude.
He appeared to be overloaded and expressed fiat feeling during debriefing.
Ilis first reaction at the time of engine failure was to declare an emergency
and dial in the emergency transponder coda. He lost nearly 1600 feet altitude
before he was able to restore power to the aircraft.
Subject #3 did not seem to be well prepared with basic operating ir..ormat&--A
and skills. During his preflight planning he commented that he was not ftmiliLr
with ILS procedures. He elected to shoot a VOR approach at an ur.;ontrolled
airport because it appeared simpler than an ILS. Furthermore Ye aoted that the
ILS equipped airport was in an area on the chart with many airways and VOA
stations which he viewed as complications, not aids.
Subject 03's management style could be characterized as 1) reactive (he did
not have preplanned alternatives and was unsure of his poeition); 2) dependent
(his first act after the CIFE was to declare au emergency and ask for help);
and 3) perceptually basic (he elected an alternative which looked simplest
on the charts).
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SCENARIO: #1	 ACTION: 1) Started for
SUBJECT: 04	 Mountaindale, 2) Returned to
Link, 3) Shot one missed
approach
Subject 04 is a professional GA and military pilot with nearly 9000 hours PIC
time. He is currently active, flying a King Air and military helicopters. He
is also rated as a mechanic (AI) and has built his own homebuilt aircraft.
Subject 04 exhibited a high degree of stick and rudder competence in addition
to being constantly aware of the state of the system. He frequently cross-
checked his position and asked for enroute weather updates. He was well
prepared concerning operating information. As noted in the debriefing session
he knew precisely what the MEA's were at the point of the CIFE, what radial
he was crossing and what his theoretical fuel consumption should have been.
H , was monitoring the fuel gauges and suspected a fuel leak prior to actual
engine failure.
Subject X14 was self-reliant. He never declared an emergency and only
informed ATC of his difficulties after he had diagnosed the problem and selected
an execution strategy.
Subject #4's management style might be characterized as one which involves
1) thorough preparation, (memorized critical numbers iron ► charts and
manual); 2) constant information seeking and comparing; 3) flexibility (changed
options in light of new information concerning weather and fuel consumption);
and 4) personal control limits (executed missed approach because flight parameters
were out of his personal tolerances).
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SCENARIO: #2
SUBJECT: #5
Subject #5 is a commercial pilot with multi- and single engine land and
certifed flight instructor ratings with fifty hours in the last ninety days of
which four were instrument hours. He has a total of 1550 hours. He is in his
late 20's and is employed as a flight instructor.
The pilot departed from Seaport Beach airport. He experienced a decrease
in power at Thermal Latersection and proceeded to land at Singer Airport.
The flight proceeded routinely from Seaport to Thermal intersection. The
pilot's ground track was good. He exhibited good stick and rudder performance.
Difficulties were experienced with communication. At the first report of tur-
bulence, the pilot decreased power to slow the aircraft down. North of Thermal
intersection the pilot experienced a subtle rpm loss. This was detected by
the pilot visually. He was also sensitive to the fact that the temperature gauges
were changing; both the cylinder head temperature and oil temperature. Upon
debriefing the pilot indicated that he was very slow to incorporate diagnostic
changes to isolate or fix the problem, though eventually he did switch tanks,
switch the wags and adjust mixture and carburetor heat. In fact, he left the
carburetor heat on throughout the flight. The aircraft began to have altitude
problems immediately. The pilot declared an emergency. He was convinced
the airplane would not fly much longer and proceeded to ask for an off-airport
landing. Airspeed was maintained at about 75-80 mph. The pilot pulled the
throttle back because he didn't want to full bore a sick engine. The rpm decrease
was stabilized at 1500 rpm. As the pilot began to lose altitude, the researchers
decided to open Singer airport for a landing and after much persuasion by the air
traffic controller convinced the pilot to attempt to fly to Singer where he
successfully landed the aircraft.
During the debriefing the pilot felt that he was not in complete control despite
his familiarity with this kind of equipment. He exhibited deviations in headings,
and, as indicated above, made no attempt to keep the aircraft at the maximum
altitude. His diagnosis was that the aircraft probably had induction icing, which
is the reason that he kept the carburetor heat on. His management style might
be characterized as becoming convinced that the airplane could not fly much
longer and setting himself for an emergency landing regardless of the potential
to use altitude trade-offs to get to nearby airports.
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SCENARIO: #2
SUBJECT: #6
Subject #6 is a 5,000 hour commercial aircraft, single, multi-engine, land-
rated pilot. He has had experience in turbine aircraft. He has had two hundred
hours total instrument, ten hours in She last thirty days and fifty hours in the last
ninety days. His most recent IFR training flight was June, 1979. He typically
flys a Cessna 182RG. He has over 1500 multi-engine, single pilot experience.
He also is an air traffic controller.
Subject #6 took off IFR from Seaport to Mountaindale. At Thermal Intersection
he encountered power difficulties. He proceeded on and landed at Mountaindale
airport.
The pre-CIFE part of the flight was normal with the pilot exhibiting good
stick and rudder control. He was very conscious of weather and frequently asked
for weather updates at Alountaindale throughout his flight. As he began to
encounter moderate turbulence south of Thermal, he requested and received clear-
ance to 9, 000 feet. As he climbed through 8500 the CIFE was initiated with a
gradual reduction in rpm. The pilot noted that the rpm did not return to the
initial level. Thus he began to assess the fact that the aircraft was losing
power. He initiated immediate action in terms of changing fuel selector switch,
switching the malts and using carburetor heat. He was conscious of the increased
temperature for cylinder head and oil but was relieved that there was no change
in oil pressure. This led him to believe that the problem was not basically an
engine problem, or at least an oil loss problem. The pilot's flying strategy
changed at the time of the CIFE to very slow flight, 60 mph, in order to main-
tain his altitude as much as possible. He had made his own decision to proceed
direct to Mountaindale, but alerted the air traffic controller of his problems.
(Incidently, he felt the air traffic controller was not particularly sympathetic
or helpful to his problem. For example, he was concerned with the minimum
vectoring altitude around Mountaindale, which he claimed he never received.)
He was conscious of wind conditions being in his favor throughout most of the
flight and decided that he had a good twenty to thirty minutes with the aircraft
operating at 1500 to 1700 rpm.
The pilot stated upon debriefing that he knew he could maintain 2, 000 or
3,000 feet with 1700 rpm. His main concern was getting over the mountains.
One interesting aspect of the flight occurred when the pilot reached the
'Mountaindale area. He elected to pull the power to lose altitude rather than
to trade altitude for air speed. His decision was explained on the basis that
he wanted to make his approach as slow as possible because he did not want
to execute a missed approach. This pilot's management style was 1) sticking
to his original flight plan, 2) eliminating turning back into the wind by returning
to Link or to Seaport, and 3) determining it was unacceptable to seek a landing
elsewhere since the area was IFR.
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SCENARIO: 02
SUBJECT: #7
This subject was a 3,000 hour commercial CFI instrumented rated pilot
who had had considerable experience in Navy jets, multi- and single engines.
He had had limited experience in light aircraft and only four hours of total
flying in the last ninety days, of which there were no hours of instrument
flying. His last instrument proficiency check was two years ago.
His initial preparation time before the flight was approximately forty
minutes, which subsequently he argued was insufficient for his current exper-
fence in IFR flying. Examination of the pilot controller tapes and initial pre-
CIFE navigation and flight control indicates that the pilot did a good job in
complying with his clearance, in communication and navigation and was rated
high in terms of aircraft attitude control.
Twenty-five minutes into the flight, after reaching Thermal Intersection,
the pilot experienced a gradual decrease in rpm from 2500 to 1500. At that
time he was cruising at 6, 000 feet. He asked for an immediate descent to
the nearest airport but was reminded by Center that the area was currently
IFR. As he proceeded to lose altitude, holding his airspeed at approximately
85 mph, he reported at 5, 000 feet, at which time the controller asked him if
he wished to declare an emergency, upon which he agreed. Analysis of his
ground track showed erratic heading maneuvers, including a 360° maneuver
northwest of Thermal.
The pilot, after asking for weather, and rejecting the idea of continuing
the flight over the mountains to Mountaindale decided to divert to Link County
airport. At that time he was losing altitude and was at 4500 feet. Because
of the concern by the research staff of his ability to get to Link, with his current
air speed and rate of descent, it was decided to have another light aircraft report
out of Singer airport that it was turning VFR. At the Center's suggestion the
pilot opted to go direct to Singer. His altitude at that time was approximately
3,500 feet.
The pilot, four minutes after the LIFE, reported his concern that the
engine instruments were reading high and said that he could "anticipate" engine
failure. Upon the direct clearance to Singer, the pilot requested both vector
and headings distance to Singer, as well as field elevation In the event of
possible radio failure. The pilot proceeded direct to Singer at 3,500 feet, and
successfully landed the aircraft.
The debriefing of this pilot is particularly insightful and indicates that the
pilot had an acute sense of the failure of his own performance in this situation.
His major concern was his lack of preparation for procedures to handle what
he conceived to be an icing problem. He detected the rpm loss visually, not
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aurally and confirmed it upon application of carburetor heat, in wL';n case the
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rpm did not return to its original level. He was particularly conscious of air
speed and altitude; so much so that he "admitted" that he lost his scan capa-
bility. As a result of this his heading became erratic immediately after the
LIFE. The pilot admitted, upon debriefing, that he literally turned the
	 t
navigation of the airplane over to venter.
	 j
His immediate concern following the LIFE was to get the aircraft on the
ground as soon as possible. After the aircraft maintained 1500 rpm for several
minutes he believed he could maintain 1500 rpm and 3,500 feet in proceeding
to his new destination. He was not particularly conscious of his air speed.
The relatively high air speed the he selected (85) caused a descent rate that
prompted the researchers to open up an emergency landing field for the pilot.
Since his problem occurred right after switching the tanks, his first concern
was that there was a fuel problem. However, the fact that the rpm could be
maintained at 1, 500 dissuaded him from this particular position. The pilot,
on debriefing, was not sure why he did not slow up the airplane for altitude.
He was ashamed that he was not aware of the position of Singer airport on his
chart. The pilot was sensitive to increasing temperatures for cylinder head
and oil .emperature, and this created a sense of urgency on his part for getting
the airplane down. He tried to get out the flight manual for the aircraft to
determine proper procedures for icing. He was resigned to bringing the air-
craft to an off airport landing.
This pilot diagnosed his problem to be one of inadequate preflight prepara-
tion in terms of alternate airports and preparation for handling procedures in
the event of icing (which he had diagnosed as his problem). Thus, with the
Introduction of the CIFE he became overly absorbed in his altitude control,
lost his basic scan pattern and proceeded to develop heading problems. With
all of this workload upon him the pilot essentially opted to turn the navigation
decision over to Center. Indeed, it was the controller who recommended Singer
airport as an alternate for the pilot. The pilot had agreed with the debriefer
that the situation was very realistic and, in fact, was worried that he might
develop vertigo with his heading diversions immediately following the CIFE.
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SCENARIO: #2
SUBJECT: #8
Subject #8 is a newly-minted IFR pilot with approximately 250 hours. He is
thirty years old and took up flying after graduation from college. Most of
his experience has been in fixed wing, fixed pitch, fixed gear aircraft. He
currently flies a 172. He has had considerable experience in the simulator.
His preflight might be considered extremely ponderous and slow as the pilot
sat in the cockpit for almost fifteen minutes before initiating takeoff. He
seemed very meticulous in terms of organization of cockpit housekeeping.
The pilot was IFR from Seaport to Tountaindale. Upon the initiation of
the CIFE eventually he was radar-vectored to Singer airport for a landing.
His pre-CIFE flie.t might be characterized as average in terms of Stick
and rudder control. The pilot apparently had only minimum consciousness
of his position in the air space. This was illustrated by his inability to know
the Link VOR frequency, one of the major VORs along his path. The aircraft
was cruising at 8, 000 feet near Thermal Intersection when the CIFE was initiated.
The CIFE was a gradual decrease in rpm. The pilot detected this aurally
and initiated carburetor heat action. It was clear that the pilot became rapidly
overloaded and lost scan patterns because there was considerable drifting in
heading. His first request was for a precautionary landing at the nearest air-
port. When advised that the situation was IFR, the pilot attempted to proceed
on to Mountaindale. He was reminded by air traffic control of the MEA in
the region. As his altitude began to fall, the pilot exhibited extreme measures
in air speed to keep altitude, frequently tripping the stall alarm, and at approxi-
mately 7, 000 feet the pilot, at the point of declaring an emergency, clearly
turned the navigation part of the flight over to the air traffic controller, with
a statement, "Get m^o down". At this point it was decided to open up Singer
airport VFR so that vectors could be given to him to proceed directly there.
The debriefing of this pilot suggests that he was unprepared for the emergency
and admittedly was overloaded. His concern with altitude and air speed and rpm
resulted in him spending a considerable amount of time giving information to the
air traffic controller, seemingly looking for the air traffic controller to provide
not only recommendations on where to go but what to do. It was the air traffic
controller who made the decision not to proceed up into the mountains with
decreasing altitude. It was the air traffic controller who was conscious of the
ILEA. It was the air traffic controller who ultimately had to suggest to the pilot
that he might proceed to Singer, even though this information was now avail-
able to the pilot. His management style of the CIFE might be characterized as
one of total preoccupation with one or two aircraft parameters and the inability
to "put together" a reason/decision about The nature of his problem and what to
do aboet it. He admitted on debriefing that he tried to do what he could to get
some more rpm and when he concluded that there was nothing that he could do
about it he was less concerned about the possible diagnosis of the failure.
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SCENARIO: #3
SUBJECT: #9
4
ACTION: 1) used ATC to 	 a
confirm failure, 2) attempted
one VOR approach; missed,
3) 2nd VOR approach was
successful
	
rr
Subject #9 is a flight engineer for a major airline. The majority of his
flight experience was gained in the military where he piloted single-engine
turbojet aircraft. He is still active in military aviation as an Air Guard
pilot and instructor. In GA aircraft he has earned FAA certification as a
flight instructor.
Subject #9's basic stick and rudder skills were highly refined. His
movements of controls were well planned and smoothly executed. Excursions
from assigned headings and altitudes were minimal, even during the LIFE.
Beyond the basic piloting of the aircraft, he had plenty of spare capacity to
perform navigation and communication duties. During the first IIS approach
he understood and complied with all ATC instructions, and conducted the
approach down to the decision height before executing the missed approach.
During the first approach, deviations from the glide slope and localizer center-
lines were small, and the entire approach was conducted in a stabilized con-
dition.
The CIFE started as the flight was being radar vectored for a second
approach. The flight was given a final heading to intercept the localizer course
when the localizer needle was covertly rendered inoperative. (In the failed
mode the localizer needle moves to the center and remains motionless and
there are no other cues that indicate the localizer has failed. ) When he first
saw the needle in the center, he thought he may have already intercepted the
localizer course and was passing through it. Just a few seconds later, how-
ever, he asked ATC for his position relative to the localizer course, and,
noting the discrepancy, became suspicious of the instrument. Using radar
vectors and position updates, the subject confirmed that the needle had failed
within 1 1/2 minutes after the onset of the problem, and reported his situation
to ATC.
Subject #9's next action was to choose an alternate type of approach. His
first choice was an ASR approach, but that was not available at Mountaindale.
He next considered an NDB approach, but because of intermittent and inaccurate
ADF indications he decided to proceed to the VOR and shoot the VOR approach.
Before making this decision, he checked the local winds at Mountaindale to see
if this approach would be feasible.
Subject #9 conducted one VOR approach but executed a missed approach
early in the procedure when he became suspicious of the VOR needle indication...
His suspicions were unfounded, however, and he successfully completed a
second approach and landed.
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Subject O's management style might be characterized as "aviate,
navigate, communicate". Precise control of the aircraft was maintained
at all times. He was always aware of his geographical position and used
all navigation aids "in concert" to follow his progress. He also made use of
ATC services in an efficient and organized manner. His relationship with
the radar controller was one of a cooperative effort, but he always reserved
final responsibility for the operation of the aircraft. The authoritative manner
in which he requested ATC assistance was indicative of his understanding
of the ATC system and it's capabilities and limitations. It was also evidenced
that he used ATC resources as an aid, rather than as a means to 'bail him
out".
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SCENARIO: #3
SUBJECT: #10
ACTON: 1) did not use ATC to
aid in diagnosis, 2) tried NDB
approach but went far off-course,
9) wanted another NDB but per-
suaded to do otherwise by ATC,
4) successfully completed VOR (j
approach.
Subject #10 is a private pilot with an instrument rating who has very
little experience. He has a total of almost 300 flight hours, all of which
has been in light single-engine aircraft. At the time of this experiment,
he had only recently acquired his instrument rating and did not have any
instrument experience beyond that required for the rating.
Subject # 10's basic stick and rudder skills were considered to be fair,
with occasional deviations from assigned headings and altitudes observed
during unstressed periods. At times when cockpit workload and distraction
were higher, larger deviations were observed. His communication skills
were also fair. He understood most transmissions and acknowledged using
standard phraseology. His navigation skills, however, were somewhat less
than polished. On the first ILS approach, he had much difficulty bracketing
the localizer course, and misinterpreted glide-slope indications. During the
post-flight briefing, he mentioned that he thought an "up" glide-slope needle
meant a "down" correction was needed to get back on the glide-slope.
(This is the reverse of what is true.) Following this notion he continued
to descend to intercept the glide-slope. As a result, he was always below
the glide-slope during the first approach. After the glide-slope needle had
not wavered from its full "up" indication for awhile, he thought it might be
faulty and asked for clearance to conduct a localizer approach. When the
flight was about one mile outside the outer marker, it was so cleared. The
flight reached the outer marker near the localizer course and 300 feet below
the minimum altitude published in the chart. From that point, the subject
was unable to track the localizer and wandered well to the right of course
while reaching the MDA. Finally, when still about two miles from the air-
port, he confessed to the tower controller that he was "totally off course and
lost track of time" and that a missed approach would be necessary.
During the second approach, the CIFE was introduced as the localizer was
secretly failed as the flight was given a heading to intercept the localizer course.
Shortly after the localizer was failed, the subject sensed something was wrong.
He noticed the localizer needle was centered and motionless. (For a pilot who
was totally unable to center the needle during the previous approach, this indica-
tion was, understandably , a cause for suspicion.) He switched frequencies on
his localizer receiver, and, noting no change in needle position, assumed the
system had failed.
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Because of his position relative to other navigation aids, the subject cho3e
to proceed to the beacon and conduct an NDB approach. The approach controller
cleared the flight for an NDB approach and advised the pilot that field conditions
were "500 feet overcast and two miles visibility with rain and fog". Though
the stated visibility was above the legal minimums for landing, the low reported
cAiling made visual contact with the ground during the approach unlikely.
Nevertheless, the flight proceeded to the beacon, crossed it 350 feet below the
published minimum altitude, and commenced a descent to the MDA. Shortly
thereafter the flight had wandered well to the right of course and was 260 feet
below the MDA. The pilot was not aware of how seriously he was straying
from the approach procedure and executed a missed approach only after he
was instructed to do so by ATC.
Still not aware that the weather was not suitable for such an approach,
the pilot requested another NDB approach. As the flight was preparing for a
second NDB approach, the radar controller advised the flight that current
weather conditions (500-2) were not favorable for the successful completion
of the approach. At this point the pilot decided to proceed to the VOR and
execute a VOR approach. The flight was given vectors for the final approach
course, and completed the approach and landing in a routine manner.
The subject displayed no clear management style or priority during either
the routine phaf a of the flight or the CIFE. Although basic aircraft attitude
control was adequate (i.e. the aircraft was never in serious danger of stalling
or assuming a critical attitude), on two occasions he did allow the aircraft
to wander into dangerous situations by not adhering to course and altitude
restrictions. His ability to conduct ILS approaches was severely hampered,
of course, by the erroneous impression he had about the way glide-slope
information is presented. Also, the last and eventually successful approach
(the VOR approach) was the only one where he did not stray far from the
approach course. It was interesting to note that the subject did not request
any special ATC assistance to determine the nature of his problem or how to
resolve it. Though he appeared to be familiar with most of the phraseology,
communications were limited to the customary exchanges between pilots and
controllers. In radio conversation and from the direct observation of pilot
activity during the simulation, he did not exhibit aqy outward sign of nervousness,
anxiety or being overloaded.
In summary, it seems that although the subject was able to communicate
and contrci the aircraft at, at least, a minimally acceptable level, he was unable
to make ci ucial navigation decisions in terms of heading and altitude selection.
This inability could be attributed to inexperience, poor training, or the pilot
merely having a bad day.
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SCENARIO: #3 	 ACTION: 1) ATC was largely
SUBJECT: #11	 responsible for pilot's detection
of problem, 2) pilot chose the VOR
approach to complete mission,
3) while enroute to VOR, pilot
thought localizer needle was operating
properly again and wanted to shoot
another ILS approach, 4) due to
anticipated delays, pilot changed mind
again to the VOR approach, executed it,
and landed.
Subject #11 is a relatively new pilot who holds a commercial pilot certificate
with instrument and multi-engine ratings. He is also a certified flight
instructor and works part-time as such for OSU's Department of Aviation.
He has acquired about 500 hours of total flight time, but his instrument flight
experience does not extend far beyond that required for the instrument rating.
The subject was fairly proficient at the basic control, navigation, and
communication skills. Control of the aircraft was maintained in a smooth and
coordinated manner. Deviations from assigned headings and altitudes were slight.
Though some difficulty with radio communication e quipment was encountered,
the subject usually did understand, reply, and respond properly to radio trans-
missions. His ability to navigate was also at an acceptable level. On his first
IIS approach, he had captured the localizer course and glide-slope after the
usual bracketing maneuvers. From that point, the first approach was conducted
to within 100 feet of the decision height, with a few deviations occurring around
the glide-slope and localizer course.
On the second approach, the CIFE was introduced just as the flight was getting
established on the localizer. The failure of the localizer needle was so subtle
that the pilot never noticed it, continued to the outer marker, and intercepted
the glide-elope. Still thinking all was well and that he was on the localizer
course (from the indications of the instrument in the failed mode), he continued
to descend on the glide-slope to the vicinity of the middle marker. On at least
two occasions during this descent, the flight turned to the right to headings which
should have resulted in off-course indications from the localizer needle. In
addition, the subject received three ATC warnings, since crossing the outer
marker, that the flight was observed, on radar, to be well off course. The
subject, however, continued to descend and executed a missed approach only after
he was instructed to do so by ATC. When he started his missed approach he was
less than 200 feet from the decision height, crossing the middle marker, and
was well to the right of course.
As he was climbing on his missed approach, the subject informed the radar
controller that his localizer must have failed and that he was requesting the VOR
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approach. A few minutes later, however, he thought the localizer might have
resumed normal operation and wanted to make the ILS approach. After being
informed of traffic delays for the ILS, he decided again on the VOR approach
and landed without further incident.
Though he seemed proficient in the basic skills, the way in which he man-
aged this problem raises a few questions. In the post-flight briefing, he
said he first felt something was wrong when ATC first advised him he was
off course while his own localizer needle indicated he was on course. He
also said he made a few slight turns to see if the localizer needle moved.
It is not clear, then, why the subject continued to descend another 600 feet
in the one minutes that followed the first ATC warning, or why he continued
to descend after the second and third warnings. Presumably, the additional
warnings should have lent more support to the hypothesis that some serious
navigation problems existed. Also unclear is the reason why he thought the
localizer may have started working again after he initiated the missed approach,
and why he wanted to try another ILS. (Recall that he was discouraged from
j	 trying the ILS approach due to traffic delays.)
The subject's apparent style of flight system management was to assume
everything was operating until there was substantial proof otherwise. Until
he had the evidence to prove beyond doubt that the localizer had failed, he
continued to trust it and to descend on an approach into a mountainous area.
Also, he first had to be convinced that the localizer was inoperative before he
considered other alternatives. Even after three ATC warnings and being
instructed to execute a missed approach, he was not overwhelmingly convinced
that the localizer had failed because he considered shooting the ILS again.
From this, one must conclude that either the subject did not lend much credence
to the ATC warnings, or he really wanted to believe his localizer was still
working.
This school of thought is not an entirely healthy one, and it contradicts
the more conservative philosophies prevalent in flight training circles. In
flight training it is desirable for the student to gain a basic level of suspicion
about the airworthiness of an aircraft and its systems. This is not intended
to undermine the trust a pilot has in his aircraft. It does serve, however, as
an incentive for the pilot to require proof of the integrity of aircraft instruments
and systems through preflight checking, crosschecking indicators, and
monitoring trends.
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SCENARIO: #3	 ACTION: 1) became suspicious of
SUBJECT: #12	 localizer needle but continued approach,
2) assumed localizer failure when ATC
told flight i` was off-course, 3) chose
to conduct VOR approach and completed
it (with difficulty)
Subject 12 is a pilot of average experience. He holds a commercial pilot
certificate with an instrument rating. He is also a certified flight instructor
and is employed part time as such for OSU's Department of Aviation. All of
his flight experience has been in light single-engine aircraft, and his instru-
ment experience extends slightly beyond that required for the rating.
Subject 112 was not very proficient in the basic communication, navigation,
and aircraft control skills. On a few occasions he missed entire radit) messages
which were intended for him even though there were no apparent problems with
his airborne equipment. At other times he did understand and comply with the
bulk of the instructions but it was necessary to repeat some of the details for
him. In controlling the aircraft he allowed some fair-sized oscillations to
occur around assigned headings and altitudes. He did maintain general control
but it was not precise. The subject also had difficulty in navigating. On his
first ILS approach he had trouble bracketing and staying on the localizer course.
This problem was compounded by his feeling that he had an oil pressure problem.
(In fact, no problem existed. Subject #12 may have been looking for problems
to occur, given the nature of the study.) A short time after crossing the --ntkr
marker, the flight had deviated well to the right of course, when he announced
his missed approach and his intentions to try another IIS.
The CIFE occurred on the second approach in the form of a localizer failure
as the flight was being vectored to the final approach course. About 1 1/"-)
minutes after the failure occurred, the subject became suspicious of his instru-
ment and asked the radar controller if he showed the flight established on the
localizer course. (During the post-flight briefing he said the apparent
insensitivity of the needle to changes in position led to this suspicion.) The
flight was advised that it was near the centerline, but, on its present heading,
would not intercept the localizer centerline for another two miles. The flight
then assumed a heading which paralelled the localizer but kept it slightly to the
south of course. About two minutes later the flight was advised it was one mile
from the outer marker, slightly to the south of course, and it was instructed
to change frequencies. As the flight crossed the outer marker it turned to
headings (40° to 50° to the right of course) which should have resulted in off-
course indications from the localizer needle. The flight began to descend on
the glide-slope but continued digressing from the localizer course. At the first
suggestion from ATC that the flight was significantly off-course, Subject vi 12
initiated a missed approach and advised the controller that his localizer must
have failed. The subject chose to execute the VOR approach to complete the
,y a
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flight but had much difficulty doing so. A great deal of ATC assistance was
required to get the flight on the VOR final approach course. Once established,
however, the flight completed the approach and landed without further incident.
It was not clear what Subject #12's method of managing the LIFE was from
observing his actions. During the post-flight briefing he did mention that,
once the localizer failure was suspected, he decided to continue the approach
until he was certain of the failure. Once the problem was confirmed, he said
his next action was to climb to a safe altitude and then decide what to do next.
It was apparent at several points in the flight that he was being taxed by
different situations to near the limits of his piloting resources. As he crossed
the outer marker on both IL4 approaches, for example, (a point where workload
is usually higher), heading and aircraft control became progressively more
erratic. This overloading, no doubt, had an effect on his perception of the
problem and the way he managed it. This may explain wbv the flight continued
for several minutes in attempting the IIS approach after a localizer failure
had been suspected. It may also have been the reason by the subject did
not continue with any diagnostic activity once he suspected the failure. (The
40' to SO' heading deviations with no needle change should have been enough
evidence.) It was not until the advisory from ATC that the flight was off-
course that his suspicions were confirmed.
A57
APPENDIX G
GAT-1 Performance Data
ii
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Figure Gl: Scenario #1, Data Summary Sheet
1 Pilot #1 #2 #3 A4
Licenses ASEL/INSTR CFI/A & I COMM ATP FW & RW
Ratings
U	 Total hrs . 420 5000
Rotary
1200
Turbine
8800
y; Single engine sim 420/0 4640/0 400/40 4000/190
v Total IFR/sim 7/53 38/156 50/150 750/250
k
T4 Last 90 days instr . 9/0 0/0 2/0 45/2
Type of flying Pleasure Pleasure Business Business
1	 Survey - overall (7 pts. 3.12 5.02 4.39
Instrumentation 1.53 3.61 3.23
Fuel system 5.25 7.00 5.68 6.16
Engine & operation 2.80 6.30
wElectrical system 4.77 3.34 4.13
0'1 Procedures - IFR ops 2.25 5.00C
X Weather & environment 2.10 4.90
1 Flight planning	 I	 30 min.	 I	 40 min.	 50 min.	 35 min.
1Cockpit preparation	 2.5
	 5.0
	
2.5
Communication skills 2.0 4.3 3.0
^Wwj Navigation skills
-4
1.5 3.7 1.2
'J	 Attitude control 1.5 5.7 1.2
a)
a) j Problems 5400 turn to forgot to fly clnc. behind A/C,
w Seaport radio squelch reversed VOR none
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Figure G2: Scenario #1, CIFE Response
1 Detection mode
Detection time
.A
f	 o I`iagnoslic Procedure
c.
trb
A
Prepared strategy
o Declared emergency?
Info sources usedu
Perceived cause
a^
A Observed stress
o Pilot's crit. est.
o Relevant experience
1	 a Est. flying time
heard en& quit
Immediate
knew left
tank was low.
switched
tanks
immediately
none
no
none
drained tank
1
5
same event
2 hrs.
heard eng. quit
Immediate
carb heat
switched tanks
none
no
none
drained tank
1
3
same event
1. 6 hrs.
heard eng. quit
immediate
carb heat
throttle
starter switch
switched tanks
none
yes
none
drained tank
8
9
lost 1 helo. er
1. 6 hrs.
!l
---i
fuel gauge
immediate
switched
tanks
prior to
engine
failure
identify al.
before declar
leyii
no
fuel gauge
1
9
sw, aux, to main
2 hrs.	 i
r
1 Alternatives
considered
Link Co.
Seaport
Link Co.
Mountaindale
Seaport
Mountaindale
Mountaindale
Link Co.
Link Co.
Decision Return to Continue to Continue to Continue to
Seaport Mountaindale Mountaindale Mountaindale
Had  flying time enough fuelReasons to go ILS appr. not discussed not discussed
o hom
.r,
0 Changes in plan none none Divert to Divert toQ Link Co. Link Co.
'o better distance
0 Reasons VOR Approach given fuel &
c
good weather good weather
0
Flying technique no change no change no change max. enduranc,
a^A Successful Successful ILS Successful VOR Missed VOR
Outcome NDB with aid with aid of with aid of successful VOF
of ATC ATC
Rn
ATC at Link Co.
Figure G3: Scenario #1, Decision Factors Rating
Scenario #1 1 2 3 4 Average Range
7 —
o
Estimated flying time 7 6 6 7 6.5 2
Estimated fuel on board 4 4 4 4 4.0 1
Enroute weather - 5 - 3 4.0 3
Destination weather - 6 1 3 3.3 6
Scenario #1 1 2 3 4 Average Range
Conservatism 4 6 6 7 5.7 4
Safety 6 7 7 7 6.7 2
Match with piloting skills 7 6 7 5 6.2 3
°_ Familiarity with A/C procedures 1 4 7 4 4.0 7
m Familiarity with NAV procedures 1 6 6 4 4.2 6
Proximity to original intentions 1 7 2 3 3.2 7
Compliance with FARs 1 6 6 5 4.5 6
Flying time needed to execute 4 4 4 3 3.7 2
Scenario #1 1 2 3 4	 J average	 RanfTe
A/C condition when decision made 1 7 3 7 4.5	 7
o Fuel on board 6 6 5 7 6.0	 3
Enroute weather 1 1 2 1 1.2	 2
' Destination weather 5 1 7 7 5.0	 7
Time needed to execute 7 7 4 7 6.2	 4
° Familiarity with A/C procedures involved 7 4 7 5 5.7	 4
Familiarity with NAV procedures involved 6 7 4 5 5.5	 4
Proximity to original destination 7 7 2 7 5.7	 6
Crmpliance with FARs 1 4 1 5 2.7	 5
Other - - 3 - -	 -
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Figure G4: Scenario #2, Data Summary Sheet
2 Pilot #5 #6 #7 #8
Licenses OMM/ASMEL/CF COMM/ASMEL COMINI/CFI/HEL ASEL/INSTR.
Ratings 2+ Turbine 2+, Jet, Rot
v
U Total hrs . 1550 5000 3000 300
v Single engine sim 1480/19 3000/6 2200/40 270/30
v
W
Total IFR sim
Last 90 days instr .
51/41
150/10
200/180
50/0
300/200
4/0
14/30
40/10
Type of flying Professional Pleasure Pleasure/X-Mil Pleasure
2 Survey - overall 5.56 5.00 4.59 3.79
Instrumentation 5.03 4.94
Fuel system 5.25 7.00 7.00
T, Engine & operation 5.43 4.90 3.03 3.15
vElectrical system 5.41 6.36 4.45 3.18
o Procedures - IFR ops 6.50 5.50 3.75
C
Weather & environment 5.25 6.30
2 Flight planning 25 min. 25 min. 40 min. Z
Cockpit preparation 5.2 6.0 6.2 t
Communication skills 4.7 5.7 5.5
Navigation skills 5.5 5.2 6.0 }
i Attitude control 5.5 6.0 6.5
CL
Problems communications
poor
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Figure G5: Scenario #2, CIFE Respc..se
Alternatives
	 find field
	
Link Co.	 Mountaindale
considered	 to land	 Singer	 Seaport
Link
Decision	 put down	 continue to	 divert to
off-airport	 Mountaindale	 Link Co.
Reasons
	
wanted power
	
poor weather	 Mountaindale
for landing	 in East, no	 elevation too
appr. at Singer	 high
Changes in plan	 land at	 land at
Singer	 Singer
Reasons
	
ATC suggested
	
ATC suggested
within range
	
within range
reduce pwr. ,	 slow flight	 over controlled
Flying technique	 head into wind	 tried flaps	 flew for airspeed,
for landing	 then altitude
successful	 successful	 successful VFR
Outcome
	 VFR landing	 ILS landing	 landing at
U Singer	 at Mountaindale	 Singer
c
+U
a
r
u
Detection mode Tach, Oil Temp. A/C performance Tach
Detection time 1.3 min 1.5 min 1.0 min i
•Ciagnostic Procedure
carb heat
mixture
eng. gauges
magnetos
throttle
mixture
carb heat
magnetos
switched tanks
throttle
Garb heat
Prepared strategy none none none
-Declared emergency yes yes yes
Info sources used ATC
Perceived cause induction ice internal malf, icing
Observed stress 5 5 5
Pilot's Grit. est. 7 g 6
Relevant experience carb. icing power loss pitot icing
Est. flying time 1.6 hrs. 45 min
2
U
ctr
a.
,
4J
U
u
"o
0
C
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Figure G6: Scenario #2 9
 Decision Factors Rating
r
Scenario #2 5 Average Range
Estimated flying time 6 3 4.5 4
Estimated fuel on board 5 4 4.5 2
Enroute weather 4 2 3.0 3
Destination weather 4 4 4.0 1	 -
Scenario #2	 1 5	 1 6	 1 7	 1 S	 1 Average	 I Range
Conservatism 6 4 5.0 3
Safety 7 3 5.0 5
Match with piloting skills 5 7 6.0 3	 r
Familiarity with A/C procedures 3 7 5.0 5
Familiarity with NAV procedures 7 6 6.5 2
j Proximity to original intentions 1 7 4.0 7	 f
Compliance with FARs 6 4 5.0 3
Flying time needed to execute 2 3 2.5 2
Scenario #2 5 6 7 8 Average Range
A/C condition when decision made 7 5 6.0 3
Fucl on board 2 2 2.0 1
Enroute weather 4 7 5.5 4
Destination weather 1 7 4.0 7	 1
Time needed to execute 6 7 6.5 2	 a
Familiarity with A/C procedures involved 4 5 4.5 2
Familiarity with NAV procedures involved 5 5 5.0 1
Froximity to original destination 6 7 6.5 2
Compl iance with FA Rs 4 1 2.5 4
" Other
	
ATC 7 - 7.0 1
1,
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Figure G7: Scenario #3. Data Summary Sheet
f
Pilot #9 #10 #11 2,
Licenses COMM/CFI/FE PVT/INSTR. CFI/ASMEL COMM/CFI
Ratingsg 2+, Turb. , Jet Turbine
u Total hrs . 1750 270 480 660
Single engine sim 1300/300 265/5 430/37 660/0
Total IFR/sim
Last 90 da s instr.Y
500/200
50/15
200/180
8/0
5/24
70/1
13/55
35/3
Type of flying Prof. /Mil. Pleasure Professional Professional
3 Survey - overall --- 3.9 4.9
Instrumentation ___ 3.1 ___ 5.0
Fuel system --- 6.1 _.__ 2.6
Engine & operation __.. 3.5 ___ 4.9
•0 Electrical system 4.4 ___ 4.1
Procedures - IFR ops _ _ 3.0 ____ 6.5
.-, Weather & environment 3.1 ___ 6.3
Flight planning 20 min. 35 min. 20 min. 25 min.
Cockpit preparation 6.7 4.3 5.3 5.5
Communication skills 6.3 5.0 6.0 3.5
Navigation skills 6.7 3.0 4.7 4.0
Attitude control 6.7 4.0 4.7 3.5
Problems temporary love
oil pressure
C?)I position
1. 5 min
req. selector
fuses
none
no
none
radio malf'cn
1
7
none
2 hrs.
ATC advice
5. 0 min
LOC failure on
course, pilot
flew LOC well
until MM when
ATC advised
off course
none
no
ATC
radio malf'cn
2
4
none
2 hrs.
CDI position, 1
2 min
continue until
failure verifies
no
ATC fix
radio malf' cr
5
6	 -^ILS failure
2 hrs.
Figure G8: Scenario #3, CIFE Response
r
> i
j 3 Detection mode CDI frozen
j Detection time
0.5 min
c k aud. ID,
ck. OFF flag,
''4M observed CDIr. iagnostic Procedure on final appr.a.
U+
ro
A
Prepared strategy none
o Decl a 	 emergency. no
.,4
4-1U Info sources used none
5 Perceived cause faulty needle
A Observed stress 3
w Pilot's crit. est. 5
4
A Relevant experience none
W
Est. flying time
2 hrs.— --
a0
UQ
a
M
a^
a0A
th
U
a^
A
3	 Alternatives	 NDB appr.
considered	 VOR appr.
Decision	 missed appr.
execute VOR
Reasons
	
trout le with
ADF
Changes in plan
Reasons
Flying teclinique
	
no change	 no change
successful
	
successful
Outcome
	 VOR landing	 VOR landing
at Mountaindale
	
at Mountaindale
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missed appr.,
NDB, VOR,
Seaport
missed appr.
attempt NDB
attempt VOR
appr.
15 min. delay
for NDB
no change
successful
VOR landing
at Mountaindale
I
another airpc
VOR appr. ;
missed app
execute VO&,.
only feasible
alternative j
no change,
successful
VOR lands
at Mountal'
continue but
execute NDB,
missed appr.
examine others
attempt NDB
not yet to
outter marker
missed appr.
attempt VOR
Scenario #3 9 ]0 11 12 Average_ Range
A/C condition when decision made 7 1 6 5 4.7 7
Fuel on board 1 1 7 6 3.7 7
Enroute weather - 2 4 6 4.0 5
Destination weather 6 1 1 6 3.5 6
Time needed to execute 3 6 2 7 4.5 6
Familiarity with A/C procedures involved 1 5 5 7 4.5 7
Familiarity with NAV procedures involved 6 2 5 2 3.7 5
Proximity to original destination 7 5 - 6 6.0 3
Compliance with FARs 4 4 1 6 3.7 6
Other 7 5 6 - 6.0 3
U
cj
a^
UC
S
Figure G9: Scenario #3 9 Decision Factors Rating
Scenario #3 it L12 Average Range
Estimated flying time 7 7 7 7 7.0 1
Estimated fuel on board 7 4 5 3 4.7 5
a Enroute weather - - - - - -
U Destination weather 4 3 3 3 3.2 2
Scenario #3 9 10 11	 12 Average Range
Conservatism 4 3 6 5 4.5 4
Safety 6 4 7 6 5.7 4
Dlatch with piloting skills 2 4 7 5 4.5 6
Familiarity with A/C procedures 4 2 6 4 4.0 5
Familiarity with NAV procedures 7 5 6 7 6.2 3
h Proximity to original intentions 4 6 1 6 4.2 6
Compliance with FARs 6 2 1 7 4.0 7
Flying time needed to execute 1 1 3 1 1.5 3
1.
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APPEN1Dll" H
Paper and Pencil Testing Materials
Aa0
PILOT BACKGROUND DATA
Subject #:
Date:
Time:
Pilot licenses held:
Ratings and limitations:
Primary flight training:	 military	 civilian
Type of flying done most often:
Ll airline EIGA comm business mil itary D pleasure
Total flying time:	 hr s.
Total small, single engine:	 hr s.
Total 1FR:	 hr s.
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GENERAL, INTRODUCTION
Toda y we would like you to participate in a few paper and 	 11
pencil scenarios. We will be considering a series of hypothetical
flights which will take place in the Northeastern United States. 	 '1
The booklet in front of you contains some information which we will
proceed through in a step-wise fashion.
Page 1 shows a map of the Northeastern and Northcentral 	 I
United States, and Southeastern: and Southcentral Canada. All
of the hypothetical flights we will consider will take place in
the area surrounded by the dashed lines. You can see this includes
Vermont, New Hampshire, and parts of Maine, Massachusetts, New
York, and Quebec.
Page 2 is a simpl;_fied weather chart of the same region.
Pictured on this chart are the major weather systems prevalent
during the time of these flights. As you can see, a low pressure
system is centered over Michi gan and Lake Huron, and it is moving
very slowl y eastward. A warm front extends from the low center
northeastward. and a cold front extends from the low center scuth-
ward. Our area of concern is the recion within the dashed lines.
The weather- in this area has been caused by the warm, front and is
generally -airy and drizzly, with light southeast winds and reduced
visibilities. There is no severe weather in this ,area. Although
the cold front is approaching the area, it is a relatively dr.:,
front and should not ne a factor during the time we will be flying.
A weather depiction chart is shown on pace 3. I • • hcws the
areas where visibilities are less than 3 miles and/or the ceilings
less th a -, 1000' by enclosing these aioas in a :,olid line. Scall:ped
lines surround the areas whe-r± ceilin g s are betwee;i 1000' and
5000', and visibilities are greater than 3 miles. You can see
A82
that IFR conditions prevail over most of our area of c^ncern,
except over northeastern New York, where conditions are slightly
better.
These charts are intended to give you a brief overview of
the "big" weather picture. More detailed information on the
weather will be provided when appropoiate.
The airplane yo!i will be flying is a Cherokee Arrow. This
is a typical four-place plane with retractable landing gear and
constant speed propellor. It is powered by a 200 HP, fuel injected
engine. The airplane is equipped with s y ndard IFR instrumentation
and avionics. This should be ample information for you to begin
our paper and pencil scenarios.
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Instructions for PAP Diagnosis:
You have been given a brief rundown on the plane, airspace and current weather. The
next phase of our study %will proceed as follows: First, I will read you an introduction to a
flight you %till be taking. Then I .will read to you some symptoms which will indicate some
form of problem with the plane you are flying. After that, I %will start the clock and you
will have 4 minutes to diagnose the problem. Referring to your ding-ram of the ARROW _
i	 cument panel, and your knowledge of aircraft systems, you can ask me for individual
i ...dings from the instruments and controls shown. I will respond by telling you the status
or reading of the chosen instrument or control. You can then write this information some-
where on your panel diagi-am if you wish (you'll get a clean sheet for each problem). Any
actions you may «• ant to take to improve the safety of the situation or to test the plane's
reaction should also be mentioned in the sequence you would normally use. I w ill explain
the effect of your actions in sequence. No multiple, simultaneous actions will be possible.
Please think out loud as to what the possible cause of the problem might be at any
point in your diagnosis, even if you have several potential causes in mind.
You are working against the clock. Ask for information only if you think it wit l help
your diagnosis. The information available from me concerning your panel and the cockpit
environment is adequate for complete and unan,biguous diagnosis of the given problem. Any
information "not available" will not influence the problem. An y information termed
"normal" means that the instrument reading is in its normal range or that the response of
the plane to a control input is typical for that phase of the flight.
Once you are certain that you Imow what the problem is tell me and I will verify -our
diagnosis. if you are wrong, you can continua until you've identified the cause or until
time is up. If time runs out, y ou can mike a hest press. In any case, I \Fill explain the
cause of the problem when the diagnosis period is over.
We will be trying 4 different problems. An. questions'
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FLIGHT IN'T'RODUCTION FOR DIAGNOSIS 	 .i1
Diagnosis Scenario 1
You are making a day trip from Albanv, NY to Burlington, ''T. You fly
out of Albany at 9:00 a.m. , cleared Victor-91, Burlington. You climb
to a cruising altitude of 7000 ft. After 20 minutes of routine flying you
notice the smell of hot engine oil. What would you do ?
(REND SLOWLY - repeat any portion necessar y for pilot's full understanding]
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EXPLANATION OF CAUSE FOR SCENARIO 1
FLIGHT INTRODUCTION FOR DIAGNOSIS
Diagnosis Scenario
You are making a day trip from Augusta, :Maine to Lebanon, New
Hampshire. You fly out of Augusta at 9:00 a.m. , cleared Victor 39
to Neets Intersection, Victor 496 to Lebanon. You climb to a cruising
altitude of 6000 feet. After 15 minutes of routine flying in instrument
conditions, your instruments indicate an increase in airspeed and
steadily decreasing altitude while maintaining level flight attitude.
What is the first thing you would do'
%92
EXPLANATION OF CAUSE FOR SCENARIO ?
Your vacuum pump failed as indicated by the low reading of the
suction gauge. The vacuum pump drives the attitude and directioital
gyros. As the artificial horizon lost its drive it started to sag to
the right and you compensated by turning left, leveling the artificial
horizon and putting the plane in a slow, descending left bank. The
airspeed increase was due to the slight nose-down attitude.
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FLIGHT INTRODUCTION FOR DL4GN(?SIS
Diagnosis Scenario 3
You are making a day trip from Keene, New Hampshire to Montpelier,
Vermont. You fly out of Keene at 10:30 a. m. , cleared Victor-151 to
Montpelier. You climb to a cruising altitude of 5000 feet. After 20
minutes of routine cruise your engine suddenly starts running extremely
rough, shaking the whole plane and losing about 20% of its cruise power.
%Vhat is the first thing you would do?
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EXPLANATION OF CAUSE FOR SCENARIO 3
Your ei.gine suffered a broken drive gear in the right magneto.
The resultant untimed ignition conflicted with the remaining good
ignition and caused the ext; emely rough engine and backfiring.
Switching from 'both" to the left magneto would have resulted in
a smooth running engine with slightly less power than normal cruise.
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rFLIGHT INTRODUCTION FOR DIAGNOSIS
Diagnosis Scenario 4
You are making a day trip from Sanford, Maine to Messena, New York.
You fly out of Sanford at 8:30 a. m. , cleared Victor-496 to Lebanon,
Victor 141 to Messena. You climb to an initial cruise altitude of 6000.
After about 20 minutes, Boston Center instructs you to climb and main-
tain 10, 000 feet. You acknowledge and begin your c nroute climb
between layers. After 2 minutes of climb, I ou nozice your indicated
airspeed cropping off steadily from 100 kts. , maintaining constant
pitch attitude. What would you do?
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EXPLANATION OF CAUSE FOR SCENARIO 4
As you climbed through 6500 feet, the static Fort froze over as
the outside air temperature dropped below 3'"° F. This caused the
airspeed indicator to decrease as altihide increased and the VSI and
altimeter to read low. Several corrective action:- were possible:
return to vour previous altitude of 6000 feet; open the alternate static
source; break the VSI glass.
As;
DECISION PHASE
Checklist for Each Subject
A. Have these materials ready and in the following order: 	 i
1. Figure I (Lo Enroute Chart)
2. Tables I, II, III, and IV	 (Stapled)
3. Figure II (Route Chart)
4. Figure III (Airport Chart)
B. Have Subject number, Experimenter name, and date filled out
on the "Information Sheet" and be prepared to collect data
on this sheet.
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SCENARIO E
You are at the Bangor Internation_i Airport in Bangor. Maine, and desire
to fly to Glens Fall!: , New Fork, for a 1:00 p.m. business meeting (shown in
Fig. 1). The current time is 9:00 a.m. and you feel you can be ready for departure
by 10:00 a.m. after you conduct all necessary preflight activities. -I -oe plane
you v--ill be fl y ing today is your company's Cherokee Arrow (h8086W). You
have flown this particular plane several times before and rejf-.rd it as a reli-
able airplane. A brief list of the important performance figures and IFR
equipment on board is shown in Table 1. (pause) The aircraft's fuel tanks are
full, and after a very thorough preflight inspection, y ou conclude that :t is
operationall y
 and legally ready for the flight.
Now vour attention turns to the weather and filing a flight plan. Y-)u call
the nearest Flight Service Station on the telephone and obtain the weather infor-
mation in Table II. (pause) After compiling a navigation log for the flight, you
file the flight pl:ln in Table III. (pause)
Based on the information you have received so far, would you normally
attempt this flight? ('"Ves" or "No" - Circle o , i Information Sheet, t?ar-s.;on 1. )
What bi t s of information would y ou like to have %%hich y ou don't alre ndr have?
( List on Information Sheet, Question II. ) '.fie realize y ou ma y
 not have all the
information you would like for this flight, but for the purposes of :he scenario,
assume you are satisfied and we will proceed.
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(*Remove Fig. I and replace with Fig. II)
DESCRIPTION OF THE FLIGHT
Use Fig. II to follow the progr :ss of your flight.
You were cleared to the Glens Falls airport "as filed". You lifted off
from Bangor at 10:00 a.m. , and your departure was routine. At 10:14
(14 minutes after departure) you reached your cruising level of 8000 feet
and were established on V3 northeast of the Augusta VOR. At 10:34
(34 minutes after departure) you crossed the Augusta VOR within one min-
ute of your ETA. You proceed on V39 and cross Label, Limer, and beets
intersections all very close to your ETA's. You have been in instrument
conditions since departure but the flight has been smooth. At 11:21 ( 1 hour
21 minutes af ter departure) you cross Grump intersection. One minute later
you hear a short burst of static noise over your radio speakers. At the same
time you notice your VOR needles and their "on-off" flags flicker unsteadily
and return to normal indications. Curious to know what caused these events,
you glance over the instrument panel and find a "zero" reading on the ammeter.
You actuate the landing light and notice no change in ammeter indications.
From this information you conclude the alternator has failed. You follow the
procedures in the manual but vour attempts to bring the alternator back into
service are unsuccessful. Therefore, you turn off the alternator, minimize
the electrical load, and operate solel y
 on battery power.
The battery, by itself, can supply the rer ; ed power to operate your
radios for only a limited time. The amount of time you have depends on the
A 100
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size and condition of the battery, and U!e power requirements of the essential
electrical equipment you use. Even under ideal conditions battery po- er
is not expected to last longer than 50 minutes.
You are at an aitihide of 8000 feet, just west of Grump intersection. The
time is now 11:23 and you have been airborne for 1 hour and 23 minutes.
Winds are out of t he southwest at 30 knots.
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Clearlv there is a need to divert from the planned flight
and to land somewhere else. Glens Falls, your destination, is
•	 beyond your range in terms of battery time. Your ta?k now is
to find a suitable place to land.
We will replace Figure II with Figure III which is a
simplified version and includes all the airports in the area.
(It should not be assumed that all these airports are within
your range). I will act as the air traffic controller and
provide you with information about the airports as you request
it.	 information which I am prepared to give you about
PAUSE
each airport is listed in Table IV. 4
 You request each piece
of information by stating the airport name (i.e. "C") and the
particular information you desire about that airport (i.e.
"bearing and distance"). You can ask for only one piece of
information at a time. You will have two minutes to conduct
v ,Dur search and select an airport to divert to. You will be
able to fly to that airport and shoot one approach only.
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Ranking Exercise Instructions
You have just finished choosing an airport to divert to in
the face of a serious problem. Now we would like you to consider
yourself to be in that same situation again. I have a set of
cards here; each card describes an airport in terms of ATC
services, weather, the flight time from your present position to
the airport, and the approach facilities there. We would like
you to rank these airports from your "most preferable" to "least
preferable," given the same situation. Recall that you have, at
the very most, 50 minutes of battery time left. You may find it
useful to divide the airports into "sub -groups,-" rank the airports
in each sub-group, and then reconnect the sub-groups as appropriate.
Afterwards, make a final check of your complete rank and adjust
it as you think necessary.
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Go - No Go Instructions
You have just finished ranking these airports from "most
preferable" to "least preferable." The airport on the top of this
deck is the one you like the most, and the airport on the h-ttom
is the one you like the least. Presumably, you would choose to
land at this "top" airport first, in this situation, given these
airports.
Now assume that maintenance facilities to repair your air-
plane are not available at the top airport. If you land where
maintenance services are not available, you will probably be de-
layed an extra day or so in order to make arrangements to have
your aircraft repaired. If you knew airport "2" had r,taintenance
facilities, would you "pass up" airport "1" for airport "2"?
(If subject responds "Yes") Now assume maintenance services
are not available at 4 irport 2. If maintenance was available at
airport 3, would you pass up airport 2 in favor of airport 3?
(If subject responds "Yes" continue this routine until he
says "No". Record the rank order (3rd letter of the -_ode in
lower right corner of card) and the Go - No Go point (by placing
a slash in the rank between the "ao" and "no go" points)).
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TABLE I
Important Specs. and Performance Figures
	
Cruise Speed	 =
Fuel Flow (65% pwr.)
	
Usable Fuel Capacity 	 =
Endurance
	
R ange	 =
135 KTAS (65 0,7c) pwr. C 7000 feet)
10 G PH
48 gallons
4.8 hours (no reserve)
648 nautical miles (no wind, no reserve)
rFR Equipment on Board
2 NAV/CONIMs
2 VOR/ILS indicators
1 ADF
1 Three-light marker beacon receiver
1 Transponder (nof er-oding)
1 Single axis autopilot
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TABLE 11
for Glens Falls (New fork): The weather is currently "1000
feet overcast and 3 miles visibility in rain. " It is forecast
to stay that way until 1:00 p. M. , local time, when it should
improve to 1500 overcast and 5 miles visibility.
for Bangor (Maine): The weather is currently "1000 feet over-
cast and 3 miles visibility in rain and fog. " It is forecast to
remain unchanged except for a chance of 500 feet overcast and
1 mile visibility in rain, drizzle, and fog.
for Albany (New York): The weather is currently "1000 feet
overcast and 4 miles visibility in light rain. " It is forecast
to remain the same until 1:00 p. m. , at which time it should
improve to "1500 overcast and 4 miles. "
Winds aloft: from the southwest (200°) at 30 knots at all
altitudes up to 9000 feet.
Icing Level: 10,000 feet.
No PIHEPs reported for the route.
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TABLE IV
	
Ill
ATC has the following information on each airport:
-ATC Services: tower w/radar (not GCA),_tower, FSS,_or none.
-Visibility: Visibility in statute miles reported by an
authorized weather observer.
-Magnetic Bearing and Diztance	 From present position to
the airport in nautical miles.
-Ceiling: Height of lowest cloud cover (feet, AGL) reported
by an authorized weather cbserver.	 [
-Terrain: Brief description of the topography of the land
surrounding the airport (i.e. level, hilly, or 	 1
Mountainous, etc.).
-Approach Aids: The most accurate type of approach at that 	 I
air port (i.e. ILS, LOC, VOR, NDB, etc.).
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Diagnosis Prohlem	 i
Subject N —
F.xperimenter
DIAGNOSIS 11 I• ( )NMATION
:11^ r. RAMIE
wings R flaps - normal external noise - normal
.wl -	 normal 'otaside air temp.	 -	 normal	 .3.4° F)
nxindscreen -	 normal cabin -	 oil drops nn flour in front of 1)il(,,t
PANEL INS'rm %IEN, TS
Attitude R Performance F.ngrine Gauges
: ► irspeed -
	 N -	 1.J:L }cts. F  tachometer - normal
FJ turn & bank - N - level El fuel -	 nr,rmal
L^	 art. horizon - N - level oil pressure - extremel y lo«' - near pe g.
direcrtional *-ro -	 N - 0 .40 oil temp,	 -	 normal
vertical speed -	 N - o ^ cyl.	 head t(-rnp.	 -	 normal
altimeter -	 N -	 OOQ^ manifold press. -	 normal
U mag. cvmp:tss - N - 040 ammeter - normal
F-- ]	 stall %y arning - N - o ff F] exhst. 9-Is temp.	 -	 normal
C 	 ucyion gauge - N U fuel now - norn -il
—ivig^,t icn
	 C-rumunicat ion
other
- 
_	
^	 tran:l,on,lc.. _	 normal
l_^ panel li ti}d ' - normal
acircuit bra	 nt)rm:,l
-	 nurnral
_1 innurrci:itors -	 normal
normal
Inf,)rn:ation Not i.istcd
!'	 I
---- - --- ---
	
—ADF - normal
1	 A 113 ----	 -	 -- - --
C'OCKP'IT CONTROLS
throttle - normal
increase - normal R
C] decrease - normal R
Subject 0'
Experimenter
I^ master switch - on
1
off - po%-e:- lost
magneto &. starter sw - both
El niiqure - normal
increase - normal R
El decrease - normal R
propeller RP1\1 - normal
El increase - normal R
El decrease - normal R
El gear selector - up
gear down - normal R
yoke - trimmed for cruise
pitch up/down - normal R
turn left right - normal R
npitch trim - normal R
C left - R P-I drop
right - R P'lI drop
off -	 engine quits
fuel selector -
	 left
right - no change
Elleft -	 no change
off -	 engine quits
alternate
	 static
	 source- closed
Qopen - no change
control actions not listed
El uitot heat - no chanl?e
NAVIGATION AND COMMUNICATION
F7 comet 1 - normal
noff - normal R
chk. CB - normal R
cornm 2 - normal
L j off - normal R
chk. CB - normal :2
L_--	 A DF - normal
L I off - normal R
chk. CB -	 normal R
A114
transponder - normal
Ll off - normal R
L^ chk. CB - normal R
C^ change code - norrr , l R
U Omni l - normal
off - normal R
chk. CB - normal R
^, mni 2 - normal
off - normal R
chk. CB - normal R
7
J
Diagnosis l'rVblelil	 "
Sub iect #
Fxperimenter	 _--	
—
DIAGNOSIS 1N t i^I^^I.\"I lON
AIi1	 1E
I_ J \rings & flans - N EI external noise -
	
engine speed increasing
F--1 cowl - N ^	 ^ outside air temp.	 -	 N (31 OF)
windscreen -	 N Cibin -	 N
PANF1, !N`rI1 UMF NTS
Attitude S Performance	 Engine Gauges
C- airspeed -	 increased by 10 kts. to L^ t:iehumeter -	 slight increase
14 5 kts.
L^ turn k. bank -	 slight left bank fuel -	 N
C] art. horizon -	 level, no movement C^ oil pressure -	 N
---^ directional ^Z, ro - no movement (250°) ^^ oil temp. - N
vertical speed -
	 increasin; negative E c}• l.	 head temp.	 -	 N
altimeter -
	 decreasing slo%rl}' from 6000° manifold cress.	 -	 N
111:19.	 compass -	 rotatim, slowly (2301 Ej :immeter - N
C Stall	 \1'aCTllil	 - off exhst, gas temp, -	 N
z4urt ion gauge -	 extrcmely low,
171 fuel n,)%%. -	 N
A115
near 11(19
Navii-ition k Commurik-ation
t ransponklrr -
	 N
omm1- N
L^ :nni 2 -	 N
( comm I - N
C^ comin 2 -	 N
A DF -	 N. mov ing
(fit her
panel lights - N
Jcircuit bi uar ers - N
__^	 annuneiatrs - N
Information Not Li^-;tcd
COCKPIT CONTROLS
	 Subject #,t
Experimenter
throttle - N
	
I	 master switch - on
increase - NR	 a off - po^%er lost
	 i
E-] decrease - \R
l	 m iNl lire - N
increase - \R
decrease - NR
C—^ propeller RL'M - N
increase - \'R
decrease - \R
-	
rear selector - up
gear down - \-R
yoke - slightl y- forward, slightly left
pitch up "down
turn left 'right - \R
pitch trim - NR
magneto &- starter sw - both
F left - R1'M drop
;,-ht - R PM drop
off -	 engine quits
fuel selector -	 left
C " i zg1 lit - no change
Qleft
- no change
_i off -	 engine quits
alternate static source- closed
Qopen - no change
I control actions not listed
pitot heat - no change
U	 _
NAVIGATION AND COMMUNICATION
tt • :Inspondcr- F7 Comm 1 - N
Off - \R U off - \R
I-hk. CB - NR chk. CB - \R
change c laic -
	 \R F comri `_' - \
l olnni	 1	 - \ ,ff - \R
off - Nil 17	 chk. CB
chk. CB - \R ^1 A D 	 - N,
omni 2 - N F-I	 off - NR
off - \R chk. CB - \R
:1111;
n chk. CB - NR
Diagnosis Problem	 3
Subject
FxPerimenter
DIAGNOSIS CNFi1RMATIoN
AIRFPLAMEi
I= wings & flaps - N
	
Q external noise - rough, vibrating engine
,xith backfiring
cowl - N
	 ^ outside air temp. - N - (40' F)
windscreen - N	 cabin - being shaken
PANEL ":STRLMENTS
Attitude & Performance	 Fri-ine Cauges
airspeed - decrease of 10 kts. tachometer - RPJi drop of 200
turn &- bank - N - level F fuel - N
F-I art.	 horizon -	 N - level oil pressure - N
I^ directional A-ro - N - 360- oil temp. -	 N
vertical speed - N - v c}•l.	 head temp	 -	 slight decrease
alt imeter -	 N - 5000' manifold press.
	 -	 slight	 .icre..,,e
mag. compass - N - 36C ammeter - N
stall «y arning -	 N - off exhst. gas temp.	 -	 large fluctuations
suction gauge - N
El fuel flow -	 %-er g- slight decrease
Navigation fi Communication
ether
transponder - N pane] 1 i L-;}u s - N
01,1111 1 - N
circuit breakers - N
omni 2 - N
annunciators - N
cumrn 1 -
Information Not Listed
comrn ^ - N
ADF - audio crackling, needle 	 -- --	 ----- -
wandering	
- ------- - -- —
	
--
A117 ^ --
	 — --
l'i..b
	
J . l
Subject 0
Experimenter
I^ master switch - on
F--1 off - power lost
magneto K starter s«• - both
left - engine runs smooth
right -
	
engine sputters, quits
aoff -	 eng ine quits
fuel selector - left
right - no change
Qleft
-	 no change
off -	 engine quits
alternate static source - closed
open - no change
i
a
C^ ADF -
.ails
omni 1 - N
r7 off - NR
chk. CB - `R
U omni 2 - N
off - NR
chk. CB - \R
off - \R
chk. C B - \R
audio crackling, needle wandering
off - NR
chk. CB - `R
COCKPIT CONTROLS
throttle - N
increase - NR
decrease - NR
nmixture - N
aincrease - NR
decrease - NR
propeller RPM - N
increase - NR
decrease - \TR
gear selector - up
gear down - NR
yoke - N	 control actions not listed
pitch up 'down - NR	 pitot heat - no change
turn left,'rigrht - NR
n pitch trim - N`R
NAVIGATION AND COMMUNICATION
transponder - N
	 c'. mm 1 - KT
U off - %R	 Off - NR
chk. CB - NR	 chk. CB - `R
change code - NR	 Comm 2 - N
Fngine Gauges
tachometer - N
fuel -	 N
oil pressure - N
Q oil temp. -	 N
cyl. head temp. - N
n.anifold press.	 -	 N
arimeter -	 N
ezhst. gas temp. -	 N
file] flow -	 N
Other
panrl lights - N
circuit breakers - N
annunciators - N
Diagnosis Problem
	
4
Subject #
Experimenter
DEAGNOSIS IINFORMATION
.^ I R F IZ^ ^ i E
IJ wil.gs & flaps - N
cOvl - N
-,windscreen - N
PANEL INSTRUMENTS
Attitude & Performance
airspeed -	 sloely decreasing from
100 kts .
turn & bank -
	
N - level
art. horizon -
	 N - climb
I= directional gyro -	 N - (3001
vertical speed -	 sluggish, low
(100 ft.,'min. )
altimeter - low - only 6300'
mag. compass - N - (300)
stall warning -	 N - off
suet ion gauge -	 N
Navigation & C'o;nmunication
i ransponder - N
0 ulnnl I - N
oinni ° - N
comm I - N
Q exiernal noise - N
Q - Outside air temp. - N (30° F)
El cabin - N
Inform:ltion Not Listed
comm 3 - N
A D F - N
	 El
A 118A
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COCKPIT CONTROLS Subject #
Experimenter
throttle- N IJ master switch -	 on
t
increase - NR, no airspeed F^
	
off - N - power lost
increase
decrease - \R, no airspeed
I
magneto &- starter sw - both
mixture -
increase
N left - N - RPM drop
a increase -	 :SIR ^	 right - N - RPNT drop
adecrease - \TR a	 off - N - engine quits
Q propeller RPNI - N E^ fuel selector -	 left
increase - NR C	 right - N - no change
decrease - NR
1Q	 left - N - no change
FJ gear selector -	 up off - N - engine quits
gear down - N"R alternate
	 static source - closed
aopen - airspeed suddenly increases,
vert. speed reads correctly but sluggish
yoke - N C control actions not listed
pitch up-'down -	 up - airspeed lf-- 
d
1
	
break airspeed caseldecreases faster: down - airspeed stabilizes
turn left 'right - NYR break ^'SI case - airspeed
returns to
pitch trim - \R
F-] break altimeter case -	
normal
Dltot }teat - no change
NAVIGATION AND COMMUNICA FION 1
transponder -	 N n comm 1 - N
off - \R
1
off -	 \R
L _J chk. CB - NR ^	 hk. C B - \R
L^ charnke code -	 NR co-nnl 2 - N
Omni 1 - N l^	 off - NR
off -
	 NR ::^.	 C B -	 R
chk. CB -	 Nl; A D F - N
omni 2 - N C^	 o ff - \R
Off - NR
	
A 118B ^ ^ chk. CB - \R
n chk. CB -	 \R
hi
P/P DIAGNOSIS SUMMARY
Diagnosis Problem
Subject #_
E.\I.)erimenter	 -----
Potential causes mentioned and sequence location
Lest guess on final dia_rnosis
Tirne of final diagnosis
is guess or dia,mosis correct' F^ yes
Estimated time plane would fly
Judged criticality (kale 1-7)
After pilot kncws correct cause of problem;:
estimated time plane would fly
judged criticality
 (scale of 1-7)
or time out=
= no
iJ
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APPENDI\ I
Conditions for the Use of the Additive Model
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Conditions For the Use of the Additive 'Model
It has long been recognized in the conjoint measurement approach that
situations could exist where numerical "goodness-of-fit" metrics would not
be able to determine if the proposed composition rule is actually the best:
Conjoint measurement addresses the issues of composition and measurement
simultaneously. If, however, the dependent variable does not follow the stated
composition rule to a suitable degree, it may be because either the composition
rule is invalid, or the numerical scales are inadequate. At this point an
analysis of the ordinal input data is required to determine which of the possible
explanations holds. Krantz and Tversky (1971) outlined several testable
properties of ordinal input data which could be used to determine which of the
various composition rules describes the actual process. They intended for
their "axiomatic" approach to be considered in a complementary fashion with
numerical goodness-of-fit approaches.
In cases where any factor is varied over two levels, the property of
ordinal independence is the only one required for the additive model to be
considered as feasible. This is not to be confused with the property of
orthogonality between attributes. An explanation of this independence property
is given in the words of Krantz and Tversky:
"The essence of ordinal independence is that the ordering of
the dependent variable can tie used to order some of the independ-
ent variables (i.e., factors) in a manner that does not depend on
the remaining variables. " (Krantz and Tversky, 1971).
A mathematical representation of ordinal independence can be developed in
the following way. If the two levels for each of the four attributes are
described as in Equatiou E2,
xl=aorb,
x,,=gorf,
x 3 = porq, and
x 4 y or z,
	 (E2)
then each alternative could be defined by the attribute values which are assigned
to it (for example, (a,g,q,y) is the alternative where x l
 = a, x, = g, x 3 = q, and
x 4
 = y). If (a, g, p,y)'(b,g,p,y), and (a, f, p,y)'(b,f,p,y) and, in general, if
Ia.x,,,x 30 x 4 ) 
-'!(b,x,,x39x4) for all possible combinations of the values of xo,
x 3 , x4 , then x l is said to be ordinally independent of x,,, x 3 , and x 4 . Independence
of the other attributes is defined in the same fashion. -
One problem that must be considered when testing an y
 axiom is the presence
of error in the raw (ranked) data. in most cases, ►.,e data are regarded as
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"fallible" in the sense that slight fluctuations or local errors occur in the
ranks. This can lead to refuting an ordinal property on a strict basis,
even though the property is largely satisfied. U:aless the compliance
criterion is relaxed to Include those cases where the property is strongly
though not strictly obeyed, no composition rule can be supported by these
tests.
In order to account for the effects of fallible data, Krantz and Tverskv
propose that ordinal independence be expressed probabilistically to take
on the view of statistical independence. Required ordinal properties can
be interpreted as statistical hypotheses and tested accordingly. This
would minimize the effects of slight inconsistencies in the ranked data on
the selection of a composition rule.
A sensitivity analysis was performed to see how many inconsistencies
could be introduced to the rank before the additive model became excessively
distorted. The approach taken was to start with a rank which was in strict
accordance with the Krantz-Tverskv tests and progressively alter it. At
each point the relative importance of each attribute was compared with that
of the original rank (the relative importance of the attributes was determined
from the coefficients obtained by the regression procedure outlined in
Chapter 5). The initial rant; for airports A through P was as follows:
A B C D E F G H I J K L Ni N O P
16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9
	 8 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
The numbers refer to the position each airport received in the order of pre-
ference where sixteen means "most preferable". Because the extremes in
the preference positions (for example the positions of 16, 15, 2, or 1) have
the most influence on the resulting coefficients, it was decided to move one
of them around in a systematic fashion. The sixteenth position was progress-
ively assigned to airports B, C, D, E and so on. After making the first
alteration the rank appeared as follows:
A B C D E F G H I J K L .VI N O P
15 16 14 13 12 11 10 9	 8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
The relative importance of the attributes was preserved and virtually
100% of the variation was accounted for b y
 the model. The second and third
alterations were made as follows:
A B C D E F G H I J K L 11 N O P
15 1 .1	 16	 13	 12	 11	 10	 9	 8	 7	 6	 .5	 4	 3	 2	 1
A B C D E F G H I J K L 11 N O P
15 14 13 16 12 11 10 9	 8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
u
Al22
Lii
Still the relative importance of the attributes was maintained, and the
model accounted for nearly 100 1 c of the response variation. It *. isn't until
airport G was assigned the sixteenth position that the first change in relative
importance of attributes was observed.
ABC DE FGHIJKLM NOP
15 14 13 12	 11 10 16 9	 9	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
The additive model however still accounted for 95 1" of the variation. This
analysis continued and, except for two more instances, the original relative
importance of attributes was maintained, and the model accounted for a good
portion of the variation.
This exercise is indicative of the ability of conjoint measurement and the
additive model to absorb minor blemishes in the ranked data and still faith-
fully reveal the subject's general ranking policy. It should be noted that the
inconsistencies found in the actual data were all much less serious than those
introduced in the sensitivity analysis.
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APPENDIX J
Master Summar y
 of Data for the
Destination Diversion Scenario
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-r-T-. -
MASTER SUMMARY OF DATA
The Master Summary of Data is given on the following
i	 page. The meaning of each category abbreviation is given
below.
BSUBATC is the value of the coefficient' Batc'
BS UBWX is the value of the coefficient, Bwx'
BSUBTIM is the value of the coefficient, Btim'
BSUBAPP is the value of the coefficient, Bapp.
K:OWLEDG is the score received on the knowledge survey.
TOTHRS is the total flying experience in hours.
SEHRS is the total flight experience in single-engine
airplanes,in hours.
IFRHRS is total flight experience under Instrument
i
Flight Rules, in hours.
RATING is the grade of pilot certificate (PRIV= Private,
COMB= Commercial, and ATP = Airline Transport).
TRAINING is the type of basic training received (CIV=
Civilian, MIL= Military).
FLYING is the type of flying most commonly done (GA/
COM.M= General Aviation, Commercial).
SPEAR is t:ie value of the Spearman cort--ation co-
efficient for the computed value-input rank pairs.
MAINT is the number of airports t1te subject would "pass-
up" in search for an airport with maintenance
services.
WOULDGO is the response the pilot gave to the question
on whether he would attempt the flight or not.
TOTALCOR is the score received on the four diagnosis
scenarios conducted prior to the diversion-deci-
sion scenario.
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Reduced Power Diagnosis Interview
The following interview was conducted with a widely known and respected
aircraft mechanic. It demonstrates the feasibility of system problem diagnosis
from verbal description of symptoms and the information seeking and problem
solving logic used by an expert to narrow the list of plausible causes.
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IREDUCED POWER DIAGNOSIS
P = Pilot (Brooks)	 C = Consultant (Kellenbarger)	 A = Auxilliary (Giffin)
P	 Okay, I just noticed that I was cruising along at 2400 RPNI, and my power started coming
back--I've got an RPM loss. Do you have any idea what might be wrong? Or what we can
do about it'
C	 Have you tried carburetor heat?
P	 No, okay we can try that. No effect.
C	 No effect. Do you have a drop; Can you pull heat on?
P	 Yes
C	 And you push it back off and does it raise back up to normal or above normal'.)
P	 It comes back up to the reduced level to which it had dropped. To--below 24.
C	 Oil pressure, oil temperature normal ?
P	 Well, let's take a look. Okav we notice the pressure appears to be normal. I've
got a little advanced cylinder head temperature and oil temperature creeping up - it
appears.
C	 Is your mixture control full in?
P	 Okay, we had leaned for cruise at altitude, so we can richen the mixture. And we get
no significant improvement.
C	 flow about reducing the mixture control a little bit more than you had--what does that do?
P	 Okay, we can try that and it doesn't seem to help. We have a very slow loss in RP1i and
the temperature gauges are both creeping up.
C	 Have you switched tanks yet on your fuel tank'
P	 Okay, we can try that, and we get no effect.
C	 What happens if you lose a little altitude? Does this have a:... thing to do with your
temperature'
Al28
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.^	 Okay, we're on an IFR plan, so we ' re nailed at altitude, and we haven ' t talked to
Center about this vet other than calling for help, so	 could try to request a lower
altitude.
^.;	 Well, just a small amount to increase your air speed, what will that do?
Okay, It seems that the effect of the power loss is advancing faster than the improvement
we're getting from possibly going down.
A	 (At this point you're beginning to be unable to hold altitude, too. )
i
I 	 Right, that ' s going to happen real soon.
C	 Okay, have you played with the throttle in any — count--increase or decrease the throttle
to see if that has any bearing on it?
Okay, we try fire-walling it and we get an increase in RPINI's, but it's not going up to
what it normally should go to. In other words, instead of getting maybe 2650, we get
1 5 now "flat out".
I Would sa y move the throttle back and forth abruptly, at least 5 - 10 hundred RPNI's
j	 and see what happens and then leave it settle down.
Okav, we cycle throttle, and at this point, too, we've lost so much power that we're
unable to hold altitude. and the throttle cycles--the RPM cycles, but it's still not
going up to normal cruise. I'd say now we're down below 2000.
A	 (2000 R PNl , not 3000 feet?)
3	 Right.
C	 I'd say here you might switch mags and see what effect one mag has against the other
Ione. See if you have one mag going bad and it's getting out of time for one reason or
another. Be careful when y ou do this that you don't go over to a (lead mag and leave it
on too long . . .
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P	 Lose everything? Okay, we switch mags, we get a little differential between them, but
just as would be expected. We're definitely coming down now--300 feet per minute.
C	 Do you have any indication of oil leaks on the cowling that you can recognize?
P	 Nothing apparent. Now the oil temperature and c ylinder head temperature gauges are pegged.
C	 I'd declare an emergency and proceed to the closest landing strip--I guess.
P	 Okay, you wouldn't try to go over the mountains
C	 Not losing altitude.
P	 Do you think it would be better to try to put it down at on an off-airport landing--try to
go over and poke around in the soup at the airport with no tower and no reported weather
or go back to the destination airport--that's 50 miles away, can we make it? It would
take 30 minutes from here.
C	 I think I'd head over to a destination that I'd know - knew it didn't have mountains in it.
P	 So that means going back to Seaport?
C	 Yeah.
P	 Okay, there's nothing else we can do in here'?
C	 Not unless it changes somewhere along the line in going back. "'hen you change altitude
it would have something to do with it.
P	 Okay, in the last minute or two that we've been talking, the RPM' has stablized at somewhere
between 1300 and 1400, and apparently with our loss in altitude, we've been able to go down
to a point where we can stablite here. It looks like the cylinder head and oil temperature
gauges are still pegged. Our RPM loss is stablized here, we can hang on with this power
level--and uvr airspeed is very low. Does this have any effect on the decision?
C	 ' No, I would say that you ought to get to the ground as soon as possible or change altitude
due to temperature--this may have some effect on what is wrong with your engine.
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P
	
	
Okay, we can't go up at this point, we can only stay where we are or come down,
so we may be able to hold 3000 feet to Seaport--just above stall.
C	 Okay, I'd proceed to that destination.
P	 Oka--.
0
APPENDIX L
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1. AGE: Age of the subject - categorized into intervals:
1)age 4 M yrs.
2) 30 yrs. — age < 50 yrs.
3) age > 50 yrs.
2. AIRPORTS: airports the pilot was willing to pass to locate proper repair
facilities.
3. AP: Variable for airports used in computer runs .alued (0) if airports < 2
and (1) if airports > 2.
4. APP: approach attribute of an airport. Includes ILS vs. NDB approach.
5. ATC: Air Traffic Control attribute of an airport (presence of radar).
1	 6. 8 q pp: Pilots importance assessment of approach attribute of an airport.
7. BA LC : Pilots importance assessment of an air traffic control attribute of
an airport.
S. BT I'M : Pilots importance assessment of time.
9. B`Vx : Pilots importance assessment of weather.
10. Cl: Correctness score on Scenario 0 1 ipossible correct: 0-5).
11. C_: Correctness score on Scenario N 2 (possible correct: 0-5).
12. C3: Correctness score on Scenario 43 (possible correct: 0-5).
13. C4: Correctness score on Scenario 0 4 (possible correct: 0-5).
1 .3. CA1: Subjective criticality estimate of event in Scenario oil after being pro-
vided with the answer (scale 1-7; 1 = lo%%est criticality).
15. 1_A2: Subjective criticality estimate of event in Scenario 6 2 after being pro-
vided with the answer (scale 1-7: 1 = lowest criticality).
16. CA3: Subjective criticality estimate of event in Scenario *3 after being pro-
vided with the answer (scale 1-7; 1 = lowest criticalitvl.
I
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17. CAC Subjective criticality estimate of event in Scenario *4 after being
provided with the answer iscale 1-7; 1 = lowest criticalityl.
18. CATSCRI: First category score on knowledge survey - knowledge sub-	 ^!
score for engine and fuel systems (possible correct: 0-7).
19. CATSCR2: Second category score on knowledge survey - knowledge sub- 	 i l
score for electrical s y stems and cockpit instrumentation
(possible correct: 0-7).
20. CATSCR3: Third categor y score on knowledge survey - knowledge sub-
score for weather and IFR operations (possible correct: 0-6).
21. CB1: Subjective criticality estimate of event in Scenario 0 1 before being
provided with the answer ( scale 1-7; 1 =lowest criticality).
22. CB2: Subjective criticality estimate of event in Scenario +'2 before being
provided with the answer ( scale 1-7; 1 = 1oNest criticality).
23. CB3: Subjective criticalit}• estimate of event in Scenario *3 before being
provided with the answer (scale 1-7; 1 = lowest criticality).
24. CB4: Subjective criticality estimate of event in Scenario * 4 before being
provided with the answer (scale 1-7; 1 = loH• est criticalitN.).
25. CNTRLI: Number of inquiries which involved control movements in
Scenario w 1.
26. CNTRL 2: Number of inquiries which involved control movements in
Scenario 02.
27. C\7RL3: Number of inquiries which inv olved control movements in
Scenario 03.
28. CNTRL4: Number of inquiries which involved control movements in
Scenario •4.
"9. CNTRLTOT: Total number of inquiries for all four scenarios which
involved control movements
CNTRLTOT = CtiTRLl * CNTRL2 - C\TRIA - CNTRL4
30. CORINQI: Ratio of correctness to inquiries for Scenario *1:
CORI`Q1 = C1111
31. CORIN*Q2: Ratio of correctness to inquiries for Scenario w2:
CORINQ2 = C2/I2
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I	 32. CORINQ3: Ratio Of correctness to inquiries for Scenario n 3:
CORINQ3 = C3/13
33. CORINQ4: Ratio of correctness to inquiries for Scenario (t4:
CORINQ4 = C4/I4
34. CORINQT: Ratio of total correct to total inquiries for all four scenarios:
CORINQT = (C1 + C2 + C3 + C4)/ (I1 , I2 + 13 + I4)
35. DELTACI: Change in subjective criticalit y estimate of event for Scenario #1
I	 after being provided with the answer: DF LTAC 1 = CA 1 - CBI
36. DELTAC2: Change in subjective criticality estimate of event for Scenario 02
after being provided with the answer: DELTAC2 = CA2 - CB2
37. DELTAC3: Change in subjective criticality estimate of event for Scenario #3
after being provided with the answer; DELTAC3 = CA3 - CB3
1
38.  DELTAC4: Change in subjective criticality estimate of event for Scenario 04
after being provided with the answer: DELTAC4 = CA4 - CB4
39. DIF I: Difference between number of total tracks and number of unique
tracks in Scen:rio * 1: DIF 1 = TT 1 - UT 1
40. DIF°_: Difference between number of total tracks and number of unique
tracks in Scenario *^_: DIF2 = TT'_' - UT^_
I
41. DIF3: Difference between number of total tracks and number of unique
tracks in Scenario +3: DIF3 = TT3 - UT3
42. DIFY: Lifference between number of total tracks and number of unique
tricks in Scenario • 4: DIF4 = TT4 - UT4
43. DIFT: Difference between number of total tracks and number of unique
tracks in all four scenarios: DIFT = TOTTRAKS - TOTUTRKS
44. E1: Efficiency score on Scenario 01: E1 = [25 - 2 (minutes to diagnose) - (I1 -2)3
45. E^_: Efficiency score on Scenario 02: E2 = 1
.
25 - 2 (minutes to diagnose) - (12 -2)]
1	 46. E3: Efficiency score on Scenario 03: E3 = [25 - '_ (minutes to diagnose) - (13 -2)]
47. E4: Efficiency score on Scenario N4: E4 = [25 - 2 (minutes to diagnose) - (I4 -2)]
43. FLY: Computer %-ariable for the variable flying; takes values:
(0) if f ving = 1, 2, 3, or 4 = non-pleasure
(1) if flying = 5 = pleasure
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49. FLYING: Must frequent kind of flying.
Valued:
	 (1) airline
(2) Commercial
(3) Business
(4) Military
;5) Pleasure
50. GAT: Participation in general aviation simulation. 0 = did not participate,
1 = did participate
51. GATK1: Open ended knowledge test on GAT subjects - subscore on engine
operations (possible correct: 0-7).
53. GATK2: Open ended knowledge test on GAT subjects - subscore on fuel
systems (possible correct: 0-7).
53. GATK3: Open ended knowledge test on GAT subjects - subscore on electrical
s y stems (possible correct: 0-7).
54. GATK4: Open ended knowledge test on GAT subjects - subscore on cockpit
instrumentation (possible correct: 0-7).
55. GATK5: Open ended knowledge test on GAT subjects - subscore on weather
(possible correct: 0-7).
56. GATK6: Open ended knowledge test on GAT subjects - subscore on IFR
procedure (possible correct: 0-7).
57. GATKT: Average of all parts of open ended knowledge GAT test:
GATKT = GATK1 - GATK2 - GATK3 + GATK4 r GATK5 Y GATKF;
6
58. GONOGO: Designates whether the pilot would have taken the flight under the
liven conditions. Valued: (0) - would not go, (1) - would go.
59. 11: Number of inquiries in Scenario 01.
60. I`_': Number of inquiries in Scenario 03.
61. I3: Number of inquiries in Scenario 03.
63. I4: Number of inquiries in Scenario *4.
63. IF R: Variable designating upper and lower quartiles of IF  hours:
(0) if iFR hrs. -r 175
(1) if I F R hrs. '700.
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64. IFRHRS: Hours of flying under instrument flight rules.
65. INPTRI: Ratio of inquiries to total tracks in Scenario & 1: INPTRI = II/M.
66. INPTR2: Ratio of inquiries to total tracks in Scenario #2: INPTR2 = I2!TT2.
67. INPTR3: Ratio of inquiries to total tracks in Scenario 03: INPTR3 = 13/TT3.
68. INPTR4: Ratio of inquiries to total tracks in Scenario q 4: INPTR4 = I4iTT4.
69. INPTRT: Ratio of total inquiries to total tracks for all four scenarios:
INPTRT = TOTINQ%TOTTRAKS
70. KNOW: Variable designating upper and lower quartiles of FNOWLEDG scores-
(0) if KNOWLEDG { 9
(1) if KNOWLEDG 16
71. KNOWLE DG: Score on aircraft systems survey (possible correct: 0-20) .
72. LATELY: Relative amount of flying done in 1 •ist year:
(0) if pilot has more than 50 hours
(1) if pilot has less than 20 hours
73. '11: 'Merit score on Scenario #1: 'tl = (CI) x (E 1).
74. '12: 'lerit score on Scenario i2: 'M2 = (C2) x (E2).
75. '13: 'Merit score on Scenario 03: '13 = t.:3) x (E3).
76. '14: 'Merit score on Scenario 04: 'M4 = ( C4) x (E4).
`	 77. TECH: 'Mechanic: (0) = not a mechanic, (1) = mechanic.
78. PROPCONI: Proportion of control movements to inquiries in Scenario 01:
PROPCONI = CNTRLI-/I1
19. PROPCON2: Proportion of control movements to inquiries in Scenario 02:
PROPCON2 = CNTRL2,'12
80. PROPCON3: Proportion of control movements to inquiries in Scenario 03:
PROPCON3 = CNTRL3/I3
81. PROPCON4: Proportion of control movements to inquiries in Scenario 44:
PROPCON4 = CNTRL4/I4
82. PROPC
	
Proportion of total control movements to total inquiries in all
l	 four scenarios; PROPCONT = CNTRLTOT/TOTINQ
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83. RAT: 'Substitute variable for RATING used to plot initial data tables. T:1kes
on same values as RATfNG.
84. RATING: Rating type -
1 = Private
2 = Commercial
3 = .fir Transport
85. RATSCORE: Variable dividing ratings into two r, cups -
0 if private pilots iRATING = 1)
1 if commercial or air trans:)ort pilot (RATINC ='_ or 0")
86. RECENCY: Relative amount of flying time :n past year -
1 = more than 50 hours
2 = bemeen 20 and 50 hours
3 = less than 20 hours
87. S: Specific subjects involved in the GAT experiment -
0 for subject numbers 11, 31, 32, 33
1 for subject numbers 28, 34, 35, 38
88. SEIIRS: Hours of flying in a single en gine aircraft.
69. SEHRSLOG: Natural logarithm of single engine flying hours:
SEHRSLOG = LOG E (SEHRS)
90. SHRSRANK: Variable designating upper and lower quartiles for single
engine hours:
0 if SEH RS 1 488.75
1 if SEHR!^ '-2075.25
91. SUB: Variable dividing subjects -
0 if subject number is t:- 30
1 if subject number is > 30
92. SUBJECT: Subject number (N - 40)
93. T: Variable designating upper and lower divisions for the variable TIM:
0 if Th1 < .625
1 if ri'm - 1
94. TC : Variable designating upper and lower quartiles of TOTCOR:
o if TOTCOR 10
1 if TOTCOR 17
95. TDELTAC: Sum of the changes in subjective criticality estimates for 311
four scenarios: TDEI.TAC = TCRITAFT - TCRITBEF
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46. TE: Variable designating the upper and lower quartiles of TOTEFF:
0 if 'f OTF_FF < 42
I if TOTEFF a59I	 "
97. T1IRSLOG: Natural logarithm of totaly flying hou'•s;
T13RSLOG = LOG E (TOTIiRS)
96. THRSR N, K: Variable designating upper and loner quartiles for total
flying hours:
0 if "rOTH RS < 1007
1 if TOTIMS '- 5375
99. TIh: Time attribute of an alternate airport - flying time to the airport
100. TV: Variable designating upper and lower quartiles fur total merit;
0 if total merit 2^ 129.25
1 if total merit > 235
101.i OTCOR: Total correct score for all four scenarios: Tt1TCOR = C1 - C2 ? C3 + C4
(possible correct = 0-20).
i102. TOTCRITAFT: Total of subjective criticality estimates for all four scenarios
: ►fter being provided with the ans«ers-
TCRITAFT = CA  * CA2 - CA3 • CA4
10:3. TCRITBEF: Total of subjective criticality estimates for all four scenarios
before being provided %%ith the answers;
TCRITBEF = CBI CB2 + CB3 - CB4
104. TOTEFF: Total efficienc y score fur all four scenarios:
TOTEFF = E 1 - E2 • F3 • E4
105. T C)T1I RS: Total fl y ing hours.
10`. TOTINQ: Total number of inquiries for all four scenarios;
TOT'INQ=11-12-13•I4
107. TOTN'ER1T: Total merit score for all four scenarios;
TOTNt E R1 T = N11 . \12 - M3 - :114
108. TUTTRAKS: Total number of tracks for all four scenarios.
TOTTRAKS = TT1 - TT2 - TT3 - TT4
109. TOTUTRKS: Total number of unique tracks for all four scenarios:
TOTUTRKS = UT1 - UT^_ - UT3 - l_'T4
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12.5. Z4: Ratio of correctness to
Z4 = C4! TT4.
126 • ZT: Ratio of total correct tc
ZT = (Cl 'C2-C3-C
110. TRA : Variable used to plot the TRAINING values in the data tables;
1 = military
2 = civilian
111. TRAINING: Type of training (military or civilian).
112. T"T1: Total number of tracks in Scenario #1.
113. TT2: Total number of tracks in Scenario #2.
114. TT3: Total number of tracks in Scenario =3.
115. TT4: Total nurnber of tracks in Scenario =4.
116. UT1: Number of unique tracks in Scenario =1.
117. UT2: Number of unique tracks in Scenario =2.
118. UT3: Number of unique tracks in Scenario #3.
119. UT4: Number of unique tracks in Scenario #4.
120. WX: Weather attribute of an alternate airport: includes ceilings and visibilities.
121. y OUNGOLD: Variable designating the upper and loner d ; visions of the age
category;
0 if age	 30
1 if age > 50
i22. Z1: Ratio of correctness to total tracks for Scenario #1;
7_1 = C1!TT1.
123. Z2: Ratio of correctness to total tracks for Scenario =2;
Z2 = C2/TT2.
124. L3: Ratio of correctness to total tracks for Scenario =3:
Z3 = C3lTT3.
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